
# FARAN

## JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

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RESEARCH FORUM
GOVERNMENT ISLAMIA GRADUATE COLLEGE CIVIL LINES,
LAHORE

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#### FARAN JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

Volume: 3 Number: 1 Spring: 2022

Patron and Editor-In-Chief Dr. Akhtar Hussain Sandhu

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## AN AUTO ETHNOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF HINDU JATS:

#### AN AGRARIAN COMMUNITY OF NORTHERN INDIA

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#### **ABSTRACT:**

A watershed moment was registered in the world history as the farm agitation in India that started in September 2020 concluded in farmers' victory in November 2021 with an annulment of three legislation introduced by the government of India through Gazette notification. The magnitude of the sacrifice is unprecedented as more than 700 farmers lost their lives over a duration of eleven months holding on to their posts on Delhi borders. This agrarian protest drew attention to the collaborative management capabilities of a community of farmers effectively operating through the unique system of brotherhoods or bhaichara, kinship and khaps practiced by Hindu, Muslim and Sikh Jats/Jatt farmers who led the protest and fostered it. The decisions were taken democratically and solutions were delivered with input from the very grassroots. The current study adopts an auto ethnographic approach in investigating the scenario that unfolded in farmers' agitations that were concentrated in Delhi. Which found support in farmers everywhere in the country. The farm agitation writes a glorious chapter in the history of people's sacrifice to uphold democracy and exercise the people's will over unheeding, unbending and neo-imperial regimes. The movement became monumental revealing that the rare possibility of farmers administering a successful movement without borrowing ideologues from outside could turn into material reality. A magnificent chapter has been written, indicated by established authority, from which farmers and people around the world can keep drawing inspiration throughout history.

**KEYWORDS:** auto ethnographic, farm laws, agrarian protest, India 2022, khaps, bhaichara, Hindu Jats.

#### INTRODUCTION

The present study adopts an auto ethnographic approach to understand the Jat community that was in the eye of the storm for leading the protest. It was a lead player and adversary in the stand-off between a government bent upon introducing laws to 'aid' and 'emancipate' its farmer who was only too suspicious of the 'intentions' of a government that did not admit regular constitutional procedures to introduce a law. The current approach does not claim authority but only attention to the other side of the picture. It will admit evidence that is anecdotal, experiential and forms the memory of an indigenous community rather than skewed statistics become a valuable route to knowledge. This is attempted here as the present author seeks to shed the chimera of objective or detached reporting on events or reporting of events with ideological implications of incidents that surround her community. Thus, farmers representing farmers, the Jat position in society being charted out from their perspective rather than evoked by often estranged reporting from outside, a dialogue unburdened by the need for evidence that is liable to be rejected due to invisible operations of traditional bias. This article registers a successful turning point in the historic farmers' agitation in India against three 'black laws' concluding in the farmers' victory as the laws were rolled back. The Three Acts that came into force in the last week of September were:

Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 2020 superseded the Act of 1955. This Act was considered a blank charter for hoarding. It should have rung alarming bells to the Indian citizens as consumers, a majority of whom remain blissfully unaware of the crisis from which they have rescued themselves, but only the farmers apprehended the consequences of which. The second was Trade and Commerce (Promotion and facilitation) Act 2020 and the third, The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services

Act 2020. Despite the altruistic sounding aims professed by the government that communicates in monologues and proclamations, the farmer interpreted the clauses as a mammoth act of betrayal for the benefit of the capitalist. It was understood that the era of contractual farming being heralded by the three laws would favour only the big capitalist who could deal with lawsuits and legal jargon.

The farmers were quick to perceive that they had no legal remedies in case of disagreement with a corporate. The appeal could be admitted only till —subdivisional magistrate level and further remedy was absolutely precluded by the new law. The corporate had an unfair advantage in all aspects and had the authority to reject farm produce at any time and rights that would interfere with farmers' access to market being promised. The corporate could take loans by mortgaging the land of the farmer who was in contract with the particular firm. It was then probable that in case the corporate was unable to pay its dues to a third party, it could auction off the farmers' lands. The government that refrained from engaging in parliamentary debates or open debates both while imposing and while repealing the law did not counter such questions. *The Indian Express* admits:

Debates are the lifeline of Parliament; their absence will diminish the institution, put a question mark on the next set of laws and deepen already hardening fault lines. <sup>1</sup>

While the farmers demanded debate and discussion, the public stayed in the land of Lotus-Eaters oblivious to questions being asked by the farmers. Was it even possible to create crops in an open environment that could meet factory standard But this impossible feat would be required once the new laws were framed and farmers would have been forced to sell well- below the Minimum Support Price (MSP). The prototype of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Committee

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Editorial. 'The way the farm laws have been repealed dents Parliament.' *The Indian Express*. January 30, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/farm-laws-repealed-parliament-debate-7648056/.

(APMC) Act 1961 implemented for the states of Punjab Haryana was introduced by the pre-partition government and retained to support farming in independent India is now under direct attack. This could be the last nail in the coffin of the Indian farmer throughout the country. The Bihar experiment that ended APMC and the government market system supported by MSP proved that former of India would be reduced to a labourer. Now, the government was making a proposition towards quashing Mandi, APMC, and MSP everywhere. Instead of granting MSP for diverse crops or implementing Swami Nathan Report the government came out with a formula that was by an analogy going to kill the patient while vouching to kill the disease.

In the beginning, the agitation was downplayed and written off in mainstream media as merely *Jat* agitation, attempts were made to malign it as an anti-nationalist and unpatriotic movement with protests supported by pro-Khalistan terrorist organizations. The one-way discourse worked with large sections of society that are influenced by divisive politics that effectively marginalizes issues of development as stakes of a handful. In a scenario where 'representations' are of utmost importance and biased representations are more normative because of hereditary segregations endorsed by caste, religion and community divides, it becomes important to give credit to a critical approach identified with autoethnography <sup>2</sup> in fostering understanding of indigenous communities. This helps circumvent or at least to balance off false notions spread in mainstream academic, intellectual, and media ambits.

<sup>2</sup>Autoethnography. *Wikipedia*.

 $https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autoethnography\#: \sim: text=Autoethnography\%20 is\%20 a\%20 form\%20 of, and\%20 social\%20 meanings\%20 and\%20 understandings$ 

Apart from the reigning theme of protest against oppressive farm laws, these organic themes emerged brotherhood of farmers, the *khaps*, and management skills of farmers with two-pronged alignments to the village and with the NRI groups.

#### **BROTHERHOOD OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA FARMERS**

Peaceful protestors asking for justice besieged Delhi. Rakhee Jagga of *The Indian Express* reports:

At Tikri and Singhu borders, several banners of Haryana-Punjab Bhaichara could be seen where farmers of both states were seen cooking together, serving together, and even sharing the stage together.<sup>3</sup>

This coming together was happy though organic achievement as the *Jat-Jatt* communities that led farmers' protest in Haryana, Punjab and Western UP revived their affiliations and brotherhood. *The Times of India* observes on December 2020 that: Ever since farmers from Punjab camped at the borders of Delhi on November 27, their counterparts from Haryana have to ensure an uninterrupted supply of milk The headline of this 28 December 2020 story is equally telling: Haryana villages forego milk supply to dairies, keep protest sites stocked.<sup>4</sup> Waraich and Goraya affirm in *The Wire*:

While *langars* kept people going with food and logistics, the village-level Panchayats of Punjab and the Khaps of Haryana and Western UP mobilized

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Rakhee Jagga.'United in protest, Haryana-Punjab farmers say: 'If our land goes what will we do with water.' *The Indian Express*. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ludhiana/united-in-protest-haryana-punjab-farmers-say-if-our-land-goes-what-will-we-do-with-water-7112003/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Haryana villages forego milk supply to dairies, keep protest sites stocked. December 28, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chandigarh/hry-villages-forego-milk-supply-to-dairies-keep-protest-sites-stocked/articleshow/79982417.cms

thousands of people on one emotional call, showing the resilience of real socio-familial bonds.<sup>5</sup>

Manraj Grewal Sharma in *The Indian Express* asserts: The agitation against the farm laws is backed by the all-powerful *khaps* (groups of villages united by a clan) that encapsulate the caste identity in Haryana.<sup>6</sup>

#### THE KHAPS

The *Khaps* are conceptual bodies that are geographically concentrated in Western UP and Haryana. They have a democratic set-up. These have had a history of martial experience and have served the country in times of various crisis. The *khaps* had been lately written -off as senile and backward-looking bodies. However, many *khaps* took progressive decisions regarding burning issues related to honour killing, dowry, and expenditure during wedding ceremonies, and even reservations. These are inclusive bodies and other castes from these areas are welcome to attend and even take prominent roles. The bodies today led by *Jats* of Haryana and UP had a crucial role in the affirmation of dormant alliances. In its April 21, 2021 headline, *The Wire* confirms the pro-active role of *Khaps*:

Haryana: Khaps Move to Resist Possible 'Forcible Removal' of Farmers from Protest Sites.<sup>7</sup>

Units of clans that can get together at a common clarion-call form Khaps. These are formed based on brotherhoods and kinship.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Anmol Waraich and G.S. Goraya. 'How the Farmers' Protest Affirmed the Potential of India's Grassroots Democracy.' January 29, 2022,

https://thewire.in/government/how-the-farmers-protest-affirmed-the-potential-of-indias-grassroots-democracy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Manraj Grewal Sharma, 'Explained: Six reasons why Haryana has become the epicenter of the farm agitation,' The Indian Express, 16 September 2021, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/haryana-farmers-protest-explained-7512582/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Khap 'Haryana: Khaps Move to Resist Possible 'Forcible Removal' of Farmers from Protest Sites'. April 21, 2021, https://thewire.in/rights/haryana-khaps-resist-forcible-removal-farmers-protest-sites-jind

#### THE MANAGEMENT SKILLS OF FARMERS

The world witnessed a successful model of collaborative and democratic management unlike any before. The farmers worked autonomously and yet synchronously to make the movement succeed with delegated tasks being carried out with great independence and laissez-faire. Interestingly, within the collaboration, there was adequate room for multiple charismatic leaders as well as followers of the cause to commit their personalities to the general cause with space and platform being accessible to anyone who would wish to make a point.

Folk singers, Ex-servicemen, film stars and regular NGO leaders joined the agitation. Every supporter to the last man, woman and child was valued. Alliances that ranged from the international to the local were invoked to keep the channels of supply and distribution running despite hurdles. Funding was forthcoming from villagers to NRI groups. PTI reports that farmers affirmed NRI support to the farmers' concerns during the protest and a great part of financial assistance came from that quarter. <sup>8</sup>Anmol Waraich and G.S. Goraya in *The Wire* article published on January 29, 2022, discuss 'How the Farmers' Protest Affirmed the Potential of India's Grassroots Democracy. The occupants of the makeshift camps of farmers demonstrated concern for their surroundings by keeping them clean and hygienic. They also catered to the regular inhabitants of the area and contributed through *langars* or mass dining facilities. The makeshift tents transformed into minivillages that had basic amenities provided for by farmers themselves. The farmers took the opportunity to highlight their culture by bringing in embellished trolleys and taking out peaceful but impressive tractor parades.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Khap 'Haryana: Khaps Move to Resist Possible 'Forcible Removal' of Farmers from Protest Sites,' April 21, 2021, https://thewire.in/rights/haryana-khaps-resist-forcible-removal-farmers-protest-sites-jind

## DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT: MANAGEMENT MODEL BY FARMERS

The myth that Indians are poor administrators and managers was busted not by hegemonic cultural groups but by Indian farmers. The agitation was well provided for by farmer-friendly groups throughout the world but the reason the farmers could sustain an agitation for such a long way was because of collaborative management at village level with services administered and rendered by *Jat* dominated villages where every community was ready to contribute. Each village is divided into 'pannas' (sections) and both human resource and food supply was managed by turn-taking that was scheduled and understood well by villagers.

Thus, the sit-ins were never short of men and women who assembled at the Delhi borders and stayed there despite inhuman acts of governments to disperse them including lathi-charge, firing squads, cutting of power/water supply and putting up barbed wires and cutting access using massive road spikes to intimidate the protestors. The khaps that are also traditionally associated with Hindu *Jats* of Haryana and Western UP also aided the agitation and displayed their martial origins by falling into battle lines (albeit peacefully) to express solidarity with the agitating brothers. The crisis came to its head when police squads besieged a sit-in led by Rakesh Tikait and his Sikh supporters. The khaps reached the site immediately averting a plausible rather very real threat of tyranny. Since then, the agitation became more fervent as broken links were re-forged.

The Muslim farmers brought the sacred 'ganga jal' (water from Holy Ganges) to quench the thirst of the common leader of all farmers the Hindu Jat Rakesh Tikait who was flanked by Sikh farmers as his counsel, guard and followers.

Even the Bhim army and SC groups declared support for the farmers. <sup>9</sup> The protestors came closer to each other raising medical camps, arranging for and distributing supplies and thinking of creative ways to keep the place clean by erecting makeshift toilets while also fixing duties to sanitize the surroundings.

More than 700 farmers were martyred during the whole protest that spanned almost a year. <sup>10</sup> The Sikh brothers comprising of Jatt Sikhs and other farmer and labour groups led the way with brothers from Haryana and UP joining. This was historic in many ways, not just in its conclusion. With elections due on February 9, 2022 in UP, Rakesh Tikait is asking why media appears saffronized with temples looming large on all media backgrounds and 'mandir' being evoked in all media foreground. The development politics of schools and hospitals are out of TV screens is an observation articulated by few in India today as the Indian audience has been primed to accept such spectacles and discourse as normative.

#### VICTORY TO THE FARMER: MEANING, SIGNIFICANCE, AND SPAN

More than 50 percent of the Indian population relies on agriculture. Despite the government's assertion, the three laws were passed without a discussion in the house and were perceived by the farmers as detrimental to their interestst. The battle of endurance was fought over the mainland as the Indian government agreed to repeal three controversial farm laws that had been passed in September 2020 as the government was unprepared to quash the laws despite open resistance. Farm unions throughout the country led the agitation with the Sikh farmers leading the front and rapidly getting massive local support from the farmers from Haryana and Western UP. In fact, farmers from all over India tried to reach the main site but were blocked

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Bhim Armyis an ideological group carved out for defending the interests of underprivileged and Scheduled castes of India. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bhim-army-chief-chandrashekhar-azad-joins-farmers-protest-centre-seeing-democracys-power-2332707

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Srishti Jaswal. *Al Jazeera*, 30 November 2021, The human cost of India's yearlong farmers' protest https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/30/human-cost-india-farmer-protest-agriculture.

at several places. It is interesting to note that the government and urban people, especially of non-agricultural communities, uniformly criticized the farmer's agitation.

This mainstream media discourse downplayed the vastness and inclusivity of the agitation dubbing it as merely 'Jat agitation'. The growing threat of exposure of the three dystopian laws as corporate-centric rather made the government take the more aggressive and rather censurable line of abusing the farmers as 'Khalistanis' or terrorist agents or even as un-representative of the farmer simpleton of India who takes everything lying down and is too-bedraggled even to stand up anywhere. However, Jats proved that they could lead the farmer of India and the world, further uphold the Rights of Consumers, and still further the rights of Citizens of a Democratic nation.

#### BACKWARD, FORWARD OR JUST AWKWARD:

The ethnic community of *Jats* was under the critical scanner ever since the Parliament of India enacted three farm laws that were formulated to reform the state of agriculture in India. *Jats* are projected to be 1-3 percent of the Indian population-demographically a minuscule community that is concentrated in Northern India. *Jats* are a primarily agrarian community that is dominant in the rural economy of the North. This community is geographically spread over four states- Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Western UP. However, just 1 percent of total demography, *Jats* make up a substantial number in the armed forces and have the majority contribution to the sports of India. India is well represented by Jat-dominated states in Olympics. Declares a headline:

Tokyo Olympics: Haryana, Punjab have 4% of India's population, 40% of Olympic squad. 11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Hindol Basu, The Times of India, July 21, 2021,

The two states, with just 4.4% share of India's population have contributed by 40 per cent to the Indian contingent with 31 athletes from Haryana and 19 from Punjab. It is remarkable that Hindu and Sikh Jats dominate these states respectively. Earlier, in October 2010 too there were similar acknowledgements in newspapers: *Jats* lead the pack at Commonwealth Games. <sup>12</sup>

#### THE SUBHEADING EXPANDS:

Jats from Haryana have won thirteen gold, four silver, and seven bronze medals in various events. <sup>12</sup> These clips would be useful in underlining the special place the community has earned or merited despite its adverse representations. It is ironic that when the tribe tries to reform, it is even then written- off as a social climber and ambitious by biased media. However, if the peasant-proprietor of North India suffers, the other agrarian communities dependent on the farmer/ peasant-proprietor will suffer even more.

#### **DISPELLING SOME DOUBTS:**

Jats are most misunderstood because they never traditionally conformed to the Hindu code and customs despite remaining in the Hindu fold. The geographical region where this community resides believes in 'peers', 'beers' and ancestral worship of 'dada bhaiya' or 'dada kheda' mounds more than in temples as noted by Phool Kumar Malik *et al*. They consider priests as any other service -providers and therefore, the priestly class rejects them. They have traditionally allowed widow-remarriage and property rights to women making the pundits dub them as lower class. Hindu Jats have been criticized and isolated on these scores lately:

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/tokyo-olympics/india-in-tokyo/tokyo-olympics-haryana-punjab-have-4-of-indias-population-40-of-olympic-squad/articleshow/84604360.cms 

12 Vikas Kahol. Jats lead the pack at Commonwealth Games. *India Today*. 
https://www.indiatoday.in/sports/commonwealth-games-2010/story/Jats-lead-the-pack-at-commonwealth-games-83807-2010-10-13

- First, for suppressing the 'Dalit' community in the region.
- Second, for rioting with Muslims in 2013.
- Third, for demanding reservations in 2016.
- Fourth, for feeding farm agitation in 2021.
- Fifth, for poor sex ratio and honor killings in the last decade.

The blanket criticism and media apathy and nationwide notoriety are understandable as few representations are unbiased or considerate of the customs of this indigenous community.

First, the position of the Dalits of Haryana and UP when compared Dalit elsewhere in India is better by far. This relativism hardly gets media attention, as observation is most likely to suggest some connection between Hindu orthodoxy and exploitative caste labour. Haryana gets a disproportionately larger share of notoriety because its Dalit is more updated, vocal and empowered. The mind of the Hindu Jat is of course vitiated by the caste system, which is peculiar to the Hindu religion, but the Jat traditionally favors 'siri-sanjhi' than caste bonded labour practiced in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.

Due to its proxymity with capital, any non-constitutional or customary provision comes more rapidly into the public gaze. This is not bad because this is another reason that *Jats* are progressive and responsive to criticism whereas dominant communities elsewhere keep enjoying their privileges in ghettoized interiors far from the media gaze, secure in Brahmanical support that is never given to *Jats* because they do not subscribe to orthodox *Code of Gentoo Law*.

It is interesting to note that the agrarian tribes of Haryana dependent upon the *Jats* are more critical of *Jats* and protest against them often while in states where they are visibly oppressed largely like Eastern UP, Bihar, Bengal and Orissa and where they live in utter destitution.

This may be because the 'Seeri-saajhi' system of Haryana has been empowering- it lends voice, dignity, equity and initial liberty. An independent autoethnographic work *Khap-Kheda-Khet Kinship* (2021) discusses the agrarian practice of "Siri-Sanjhi" working culture where "Siri-Sanjhi" refers to a partner of ups and downs, sorrow and happiness along with work'. Now, 'Siri-sanjhi' is an agreement 'for hiring a 'Seeri', half of the agreed amount is given to 'Seeri' by the farmer/zamindar in advance and half at the end of the contracted year'. Further, this age-old practice includes 'three times free food (though it is bound with the condition of deducting cost equivalent to 9 Mann 10 of Grain' (approx. 370 kgs) along with clothing and fuel support. In the olden days, Farmers/Zamindars mostly sponsored the marriage of the dependents of 'Seeries' fully or partially depending on the economic demand and situation of the 'Seeri'. The marriage sponsorship was also extended to 'the artisan fraternity tied to farmer'. In 'hiring a Sanjhi', '1/5th of the total production sharing is signed between the two with full time the clock working terms and conditions.

The instances of bonded labour are excluded as 'Seeri-Saajhi is addressed with 'Neg' (sanction) of Kheda in case of both of the same village or as per age and not by the name'. It is observed that the system geographically spans Haryana-Punjab-Delhi-West UP, Southern Uttarakhand and North Rajasthan. The mental slavery fostered by rigid orthodoxy is kept at bay enough for constitutional provisions to be acceptable, comprehensible, and implementable. This system where the harvest is distributed amongst dependent and subsidiary castes in the community by the farmer who is the kingpin of the agriculture economy and identifies himself as *Jat* is more democratic and equitable and ironically more criticized than local systems that originated elsewhere in agrarian economies of India where caste ruled dictated by the orthodox idea of caste reigned. Furthermore, Punjab (with integrated Haryana before 1966) geographically, politically and

ideologically constituted the region where emancipatory laws of Punjab began from the time when the Unionist party of Punjab was administering Punjab in the 1930s.

Securing the communal riot that took place in 2013 was the tip of an iceberg. It was most injurious to the two communities who thought each other to be aggressors rather than victims of a political plot. The riot effectively destroyed MAJGAR an alliance forged by Ch Charan Singh in the 1960s to consolidate the farming community-Muslim, *Ahir, Jat, Gujjar*, and *Rajput* together. Even AJGAR is sufficient, as Jat would naturally cover Hindu Jat and Muslim Jat in Western UP. An analysis by Praveen Dhanda in *Economic and Political Weekly* summarizes the approach, 'Singh's conception of an alternative industrial structure laid stress upon decentralized, rural-based, labour-intensive production through appropriate technology. He called for a healthy balance between labour-intensive small-scale production and capital-intensive mass production and of course, between agriculture and industry as a whole. A recent *Hindustan Times* article observes: The AJGAR equation was successfully implemented by Chaudhary Charan Singh in the 1960s.<sup>13</sup>

It is further noted that:

Chaudhary Charan Singh prepared a coalition of non-Brahmin and non-Dalit communities (*HT*). 12

However, the same report registers a new turn with the formation of GAJAB-Gurjars, Ahirs (Yadavs), *Jats* and Brahmins. The success of this SP-led alliance experiment formed in UP state election 2022 is yet to be affirmed or evaluated though. Talking about the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), it is focusing on Brahmins, but its emphasis is seen on the BDM equation - Brahmins, Dalits and Muslims, <sup>12</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Vikas Kahol. Jats lead the pack at Commonwealth Games, *India Today*, October 13, 2010,https://www.*indiatoday*.in/sports/commonwealth-games-2010/story/Jats-lead-the-pack-at-commonwealth-games-83807-2010-10-13

notes the same report.<sup>14</sup> This exclusion of *Jats* is noticeable here revealing lingering undercurrents that have stayed after communal tensions peaked and created disaster in the region in 2013.

The Muslim-Jat alliance which had been forged in the olden times because it was natural in the countryside culture, was strategically and systematically attacked over centuries to undermine Jat strength the Indian politics. First, the Greater Punjab was divided into India and Pakistan at the very outset of independence, wrenching Jats apart- Hindu, Muslim and Sikh Jats who had been peacefully living together in the countryside were torn apart by —decision-makers who did not belong to villages and came from urbane backgrounds and upper-caste echelons. Jats were never well-integrated as forwarding group in Hindu caste pantheon identifying more with their culture, community and geography than with caste.

In 2013 an 800-years old alliance of Hindu *Jat* and Muslim of Western UP was broken with a private incident taking an ugly political shape. Two Muslim youths misbehaved with a Hindu *Jat* girl whose brothers were killed by Muslim community as they protested. The incident, which exposes the character of Indian patriarchal system quickly, turned into a matter of communal divide. The Indian political scenario for the past few years had shown that a political party could practice extreme polarization on caste and communal basis. The 'Suvarna' (uppercrest) section politics informed by caste-Hindu orthodoxy makes this as its political basis. Ch Charan Singh in UP and Ch Devilal, Ch Bansi Lal in Haryana were effectively able to practice a politics of development keeping exclusively caste-oriented politics at bay by playing on local vote-banks and forging rather than

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Hindustan Times, February 19, 2022.

breaking *Jat*-Muslim alliance. This is because the interests of agricultural tribes are the same to whichever religion they may belong.

Third, the reservation riots of Haryana 2016 were 'sponsored' by the government is a contention of this community since the very beginning:

The riots in Haryana in 2016 are antithetically termed as 'state-sponsored' by *Jats* and 'Jat reservation riots' by the state'

The way the government has handled the recent farm agitation tilts the balance in favour of *Jats*. About the protests, it is claimed that:

They started peacefully but were fired upon in Rohtak leading to rioting and loss of life and property.

The *Jats* were isolated as the media projected them as aggressors while they saw themselves as victims of orchestrated riots.

In the aftermath, *all communities who announced open hatred for this community and ostracized them isolated Jats*. The demand for reservation was understandable as BJP had come to power by promising the *Jats* reservation. The *Jats* demanded reservation because the agrarian economy has completely failed to sustain farmers. Earlier during the Mandal Commission of the 90s *Jats* had rejected reservation but over the last four decades, they saw themselves completely marginalized economically, politically and socially and substantially displaced from any rights in a state where they hold majority and to which they are indigenous. Even in 2012 when the agrarian situation had deteriorated much, the *Khaps* were still divided over reservation. The lack of support to reservation agitation from Hooda, Malik, Dalal, Dahiya, and Kadian khapswere observed <sup>15</sup>

Deswal, Deepender, Reservation Issue: Report divides Khaps on Resuming Agitation,' *Times of India*,
 December
 2012.

Fourth, both Hindu Jats and Jatt Sikhs who have come closer as erstwhile parted brothers severed by religious and political divide wear the allegation as a badge of pride.

To the Fifth, the gender ratio has improved and women of Haryana are being given the opportunity in every field. However, the character of the countryside is deteriorating due to unplanned exposure to media content and rapid urbanization where traditional customs and propriety is compromised. Sub-division of land and the emergence of multiple heirs on land has precipitated an agrarian crisis that has to be dealt with by community awareness and honest government policies in keeping with indigenous ethos. Patriarchy is not an exclusive practice of *Jats* but is becoming rabid in Northern India where consumer capitalism with its disorienting cultural shock for a closed community. The very fact that after a spate of unjustifiable killings of *Jat* couples by *Jat* community who practice gotra-exogamy or sub-caste-exogamy adhering to some kind of eugenic code.

The community elders realized the extent of their loss and that the actions were suicidal for the community decided to revise the code by making it goes that are more liberal to the credit of this particular community. Not only old brotherhoods were broken but also exclusion based on the descent was given more leeway. Fortunately, the tribe has learnt though in the hard way that the need of the hour was to relax customary and conventions of the community.

#### **IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS**

This recent legislative measure was interpreted as an attack on the very sovereignty of farmers of Punjab and Haryana. Though it vitiated the atmosphere brought them together again re-awakening forgotten *bhaichara* or brotherhoods,

<sup>&#</sup>x27;http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/17620953.cms?utm\_source=contentofinterest&utm\_medium=text&utm\_campaign=cppst

dormant *khap or* kinship alliances and ancient Muslim-Jat bonhomie. In UP, a Hindu-Muslim riot stoked by political parties ultimately came to be dubbed as a *Jat*-Muslim riot again isolating Jats with regular Hindus maintaining a convenient distance from *Jats* washing their hands-off of riots though relishing the *Jat*-Muslim face-off of 2013. This may be because city-dwelling urbane communities have primarily bourgeoisie interests that are at loggerheads with those of farmers who are primarily Jat Hindus and Muslims. The broken nexus was fruitful to mill-oners who benefit from cheap farm produce and political parties that practice communal polarization in ultimately capitalist interests. A headline from the prestigious *Indian Express* that refers to a 700-page long Justice Vishnu Sahai report declares:

2013 Muzaffarnagar riots: Failure of intelligence, top officials led to riots in Muzaffarnagar, says probe panel. <sup>16</sup>

Once the state had a government that had ride the wave of riots, it came down with an apathetic response to the development and economic needs of the state. The sugarcane farmer-*Jat* and Muslim suffered but the center and state government along with the media machinery raised the phantom of Jinnah to persecute the Muslim community.

This time wary of communal politics and realizing how the *Jat* had been betrayed by capitalist Hindu forces, *Rashtriya Lok Dal* led by the grandson of Ch Charan Singh Jayant Chaudhary exposed Jinnah as a red-herring and emphasised the reality of sugarcane dues / *Ganna* arrears of farmers as real poll issue in the slogan: '*Jinnah* versus *Ganna*'. <sup>15</sup> The *Jat* community that was severed due to their temporary affiliations to BJP or media discourse rapidly realized the ground reality

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Mohd Faisal Farid, '2013 Muzaffarnagar riots: Failure of intelligence, Top officials led to riots in Muzaffarnagar, says probe panel' Accessed. February 19, 2022. *The Indian Express*. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/2013-muzaffarnagar-riots-failure-of-intelligence-top-officials-led-to-riots-in-muzaffarnagar-says-panel/

was jolted out of inertia by what seemed to be a death-blow to farm economy. This was in the form of the three farm laws.

#### Brief Historical Background of Modern Jat Politics of Punjab-Harvana

Leaders like Sir Chhotu Ram, Sir Fazl Hissain, Sir Sikandar Hyatt and Sir Khizr Hyatt Khan created a unique farmer-centric politics in Punjab. Which was disliked by mainstream nationalist parties like Congress and Muslim League that supported upper class and urban interests over the interests of the agriculturist and rural population, though they derived their power from this same rural base. It is observed:

Sir Chhotu Ram put forward the scheme of separate representatives for the urban and rural areas under the new reforms of 1919.<sup>17</sup>

It is further pointed out that:

Ostensibly, he (Chhotu Ram) advocated division and parochial policy but a deeper analysis reveals that it was to create an effective administrative equation so that the villages, that had so far been neglected, got attention and care that any government should offer to the people. It was based on the fair principle of economy and administration.<sup>18</sup>

Sir Chhotu Ram's promotion of rural schools, libraries, welfare funds and local bodies is legendary as much as his emphasis of the catchphrase 'biraderi' or brotherhood which has been recently re-invoked.<sup>19</sup>

18 Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Divya Jyoti Singh, *The Forgotten Ram The Lore and Legend of Sir Chhotu Ram*, (New Delhi: Authorspress, 2019), 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Biradri/Brotherhood "United in protest, Haryana-Punjab farmers say: 'If our land goes what will we do with water". https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ludhiana/united-in-protest-haryana-punjab-farmers-say-if-our-land-goes-what-will-we-do-with-water-7112003/

To deal with the cross-communal bonhomie and cut through Punjab solidarity, Congress and ML had to join hands and ultimately, severe Punjab through consent of the leaders making it manageable on the basis of religion and caste. During this time, the Hindu population of West Pakistan moved towards Indian Punjab settling down mainly in present day Haryana. This demographic change also changes vote-dynamics and social dynamics of any geographical territory that is also a political territory.

Once again, post-Punjabi Suba Movement originating in linguistic and cultural battles in Punjab, and later the terrorism in Punjab again led several Hindus who were non-agrarian castes to move to Haryana that had been formed in 1966. This too led to demographic change coupled to the fact that Haryana surrounds Delhi, the capital of India and the NCR sees influx of people from all over India in search livelihood.

#### CONCLUSION

The world's greatest agricultural protest movement concluded in the farmers' victory in November 2021 as *Farm Laws Repeal Bill* 2021 was passed in both the houses of the Indian parliament. This historic movement, however, suffered from the 'conspiracy of silence' as the media could not yet relieve itself from the stranglehold of increasingly suppressive incumbents.

On the International Platform, the Indian farmer through community action has countered reigning misconceptions in both Western and Eastern discourses about their propensity towards passive subjugation or unquestioning submission to despotism. In lead role was a particular farming community that is diversely known as the Jats/ Jatts and inhabits Punjab, Haryana, and Western UP. Just as they are averse to remaining subservient in an exploitative caste paradigm so are they unlikely to submit to superstition and hegemony of urban native upper-crest. The

Indian farmer along with their *Jat* brethren are not sleeping or contemptible millions of traditional Eurocentric discourses or modern-day Hindutva *doxa* but skilled administrators in their own rights who can manage, fund, and administer a peaceful protest. That went on for eleven months and heralded the victory of Indian democracy, Indian consumer and Indian farmer- all at the same time asking to be appreciated for what they are worth. It is hoped that this auto ethnographic study added new dimensions to an understanding of the farming community in India and dispelled some of the doubts and misconceptions proliferating about the agrarian community of *Jats* who do not quite fit in the orthodox caste paradigm.

## IMPACT OF CHINA'S LABOUR ON AFRICAN LABOUR RIGHTS:

## AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

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#### ABSTRACT:

The purpose of this study is to examine the threat (whether real or imagined) of China's exploitation of prison labour to make low-cost products for export to the other countries, and Chinese imperialist presence in Africa has given way to what has been called "resource nationalism," in which countries aim to take control of the exploitation of their natural resources. Chinese companies hire African workers, but pay extremely low wages and treat workers poorly. Workers frequently suffer verbal and physical abuse from Chinese managers and are treated as inferiors. Safety standards for African workers are low, as workers are employed in dangerous conditions with inadequate safety gear. Chinese products are priced so low that they often out-compete local African businesses, undermining local labour in that way as well. Each year, thousands of Chinese labourers are sent to Africa and other third-world countries to build roads and work on construction projects. There is a lack of disaggregated and detailed data about the nature and contribution of China's trade in Africa. This study was therefore designed to examine the extent of China's trade, China's forced labour and standards in Africa, and the role of the African trade unions in responding to the Chinese companies' violations of the African worker rights.

**KEYWORDS:** China, Africa, labour markets, China's companies, development in Africa, poor labour, trans-national corporations, Chinese investment in Africa, African companies and Chinese labour, African labours, labour standards, Low Wages, African trade unions

#### INTRODUCTION

Research indicates that China is exporting poor labour conditions to Africa, Of course, we hasten to add that China, and Chinese companies are certainly not the first to exploit African workers and impose poor labour conditions in Africa. In many ways, Chinese companies are simply following the lead of many transnational corporations, which have been operating in Africa for decades. However, there are two notable differences<sup>20</sup>

Firstly, some transnational corporations have come under pressure from human rights activists and consumer campaigns regarding the treatment of workers both in China and in Africa. This has led to a number of transnational corporations adopting corporate social responsibility policies, which have led to some improvements in labour conditions in developing countries. In contrast, considering the Chinese government accepts poor labour conditions in China, Chinese companies are unlikely to bow to pressure from human rights groups. Indeed, Chinese investment in countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe suggest that China is not concerned by pressure from human rights organizations in relation to investment in Africa.

Secondly, in China, free trade unions are illegal and labour activists are often detained. In comparison, many African Countries have a strong trade union history. Research will discuss the numerous attempts of Chinese companies on prohibiting free trade unions in their businesses in Africa. The Union movement should place great importance on ensuring Chinese companies do not succeed in banning free trade Unions in companies in Africa, as this will no doubt have an impact on Unionism throughout Africa (and possibly the world). On the other side, if the Union movement can succeed in establishing free Trade Unions in Chinese

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, *The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa*, (U.K: University of Sussex: IDS working paper, 2007), 291.

companies in Africa, this may greatly assist the free Trade Union movement in China.<sup>21</sup>

The researcher here analyses the China-Africa relationships and the political alliances of the labour markets in Africa, now there is a huge economic factor in every investment. Different investors have different motivations. China's state-owned enterprises are more politically driven. However, the way that the Chinese companies are dealing with the African workers is still a big obstacle facing the stable relationships between China and the African continent. Unless the Chinese government tries to find a solution for this problem on the short run, the relationship between Chinese companies working in Africa and African trade unions would be shift worst. Therefore, the specific objectives of this study are to determine the following aspects:

- **A)** Composition and significance of Chinese investment in Africa, as well as the identification of labour standards there.
- **B**) The relationship between the Chinese and the Africans aflame, So, the main question should be deeply answered: How Chinese immoral companies and businessmen in Africa ruin the efforts of others who want to pay fair wages and keep their workers safe.
- C) Situation faced by African trade unions to defend the African workers in Chinese companies in Africa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Prah, KK (Ed), Afro-Chinese relations: Past, Present and Future. (Cape Town: CASAS, 2007)

China, the "world's factory", has started to move the factory floor off shore. Driven by a growing need for raw materials, an increasing consumer base and a desire to invest profits made over the last decade, the Chinese Government, as well as private Chinese companies, are looking to invest outside of China. In particular, "China" and "Chinese companies" are investing heavily in "Africa." However, along with Chinese investments, Chinese companies are bringing Chinese labour standards, including: Poverty wages, cutting corners on occupational health and safety and refusing basic workers' rights, such as the right to collectively negotiate through an independent trade union. On the other hand, the global union movement faces a massive new challenge as China attempts to export its labour practices. Therefore, the problem of our study will focus on: How could China face the African and international pressures on its poor labour in the African continent.

This study is premised on "an analytical qualitative meta-analysis framework." The search for literature chiefly focused on identifying the existing peer-reviewed 'Chinese-African-labour-focused' literature on Africa. A two-pronged approach was opted for a database-driven approach and the analytical research, which were guided by the inclusion/exclusion criteria for the rights of both Chinese and Africana labour rights. The researcher will adopt as well "case study approach" to find many instances of the Chinese and African labour practices. The case studies also include the violations of the right to pay maternity leave, even if they were enshrined in national labour legislation such as in Angola. Furthermore, in some countries, Chinese employers tended to terminate the employment of female workers during the pregnancy period. These cases constituted violations of basic international workers' rights as well as locally enshrined rights.

- 1- What are the nature of China's investments in the recent African markets during and before modern China, including China's role as employer and Chinese labour in Africa?
- 2- How can we consider labour recent standards in Chinese Companies in Africa focusing on wages, workers' right to join an independent union and occupational health and safety?
- 3- What are the local responses to Chinese Companies?
- 4- What is the impact of Chinese Companies in the role of Employer in Africa?
- 5- How could the importation of Chinese Labour affect the labour markets in Africa?
- **6-** How could the African trade unions respond the Chinese companies' violations of African workers' rights?

#### **CHINESE HUMAN PERSPECTIVE**

China's engagement with Africa today is less motivated by ideological considerations but based on a commercial agenda that aims to sustain rapid. Chinese investments in and trade with Africa have increased significantly over the past few years. China is now Africa's third largest commercial partner after the USA and France and – like the former colonial countries – backs its trading relations with aid, debt relief, scholarships, training and the provision of specialists. China also accounts for about 8% of Africa's military hardware import.<sup>22</sup> However, Africa is by no means a major destination of Chinese's investments as only about 3% of China's overall FDI outflows were destined for Africa in 2007. The researcher will focus on the following aspects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Baah, Anthony Yaw and Herbert Jaunch (eds.). "Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective," (Cape Town: African Labour Research Network, May 2009)

## A) LABOUR FORCE IN CHINA AND CHINESE LABOUR FORCE IN AFRICA

China has a labour force of 770 million of which 193,5 million are urban workers. A new middle class emerged in the cities while the earnings of farmers in rural areas declined. Rural farmers account for 47% of the population but earn only 19,9% of the national income. One strategy used by China to address the problem of unemployment is to send workers overseas to work on projects carried out by state-owned companies or through labour brokers. This explains the relatively large number of Chinese workers at construction sites as well as in some manufacturing ventures in Africa.<sup>23</sup> Workers in the southeast earn significantly higher wages than migrants from the rural areas. Migrants are also excluded from benefits such as maternity and unemployment benefits and social assistance. The "household registration system" makes it very difficult for rural workers to change their status to urban workers. The number of labour disputes in China has risen significantly in recent years as workers resorted to work stoppages, sabotage, go-slows and court action to defend their rights. The global economic crisis has affected Chinese workers directly as more than 10 million migrant workers had to return to their hometowns with little hope of finding jobs. Chinese employers tend to be amongst the lowest paying in Africa when compared with other companies in the same sector. In Zambia, for example, the Chinese copper mine paid its workers 30% less than other copper mines in the country. In general, Chinese companies do not grant African workers any meaningful benefits and in some instances ignore even those that are prescribed by law. Wages above the national average were only found at those Chinese companies with a strong trade union presence. Chinese staff

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Gao, *The History of Chinese Worker Movement*, China Labour and Social Security Press. 高。中 **国工人运**动,中国劳动社会保障出版社的历史(2008)

members enjoy significantly higher wages and more benefits than their African counterparts do.<sup>24</sup>

Chinese employers in Africa violate several of the core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. These include the rights to join trade unions, to bargain collectively, to receive equal remuneration and to be protected against discrimination. Basic rights such as paid leave are often ignored and workers are forced to work overtime at times without any additional remuneration. They feared that refusal to do so would result in their dismissal. A particularly grave case of workers' rights violations is the "locking-in" of workers during working hours, which led to deaths during fires in Nigeria and Kenya.<sup>25</sup>

#### **B) CHINESE PROJECTS IN AFRICA**

Overall, there are about 450 Chinese-owned investment projects in Africa, 46% in manufacturing, 40% in services and 9% in resource-related industries. The latter accounts for 28% of investment value. This scenario differs significantly between individual countries as Chinese investors focus on oil extraction or uranium in some countries and on construction and retail in others.


China's main exports destinations in Africa are South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria while the main African exporters to China are Angola, South Africa, Congo and Equatorial Guinea. Africa's main exports to China are minerals, petroleum and timber, involving very limited processing on the continent. Africa's imports from China consist mainly of capital and consumer goods. Overall, the trade balance is slightly in Africa's favour, although several countries like South

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Brautigam. "Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective," (India: Center for Chinese studies, May, 2011)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, *The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa*, 291.

Africa, Morocco and Ghana have substantial trade deficits.<sup>26</sup> The following figure shows the size of china's investments in Africa.

#### - Figure (1): China's outward investment in Africa.



\* Source: National statistics: Heritage Foundation, 2011.

Since 2003, China has become the second largest consumer of oil and is expected to overtake the USA by 2030. China relies on outside energy resources for its continued industrialization and currently covers about a quarter of its oil needs through imports from Africa, especially from Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, Chad and Gabon. <sup>27</sup>China's demand for raw materials has driven up world market prices for several of Africa's commodities but Africa also needs


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Konings, P. China and Africa in the Era of Neo-Liberal Globalization in *Codesria Bulletin*, No. (1), 17-22. (2007)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Ibid.

to consider the utilization of its resources for sustainable industrialization on the continent instead of remaining merely an exporter of raw materials.

Since 2000, China has established trade and investment promotion centers in Africa and also signed investment promotion agreements with over 20 countries. By 2008, the number of sizeable Chinese enterprises in Africa had reached about 800 with South Africa attracting the largest share of Chinese investments. South Africa is also the only African country with significant investments in China, mainly in mining, brewing and the financial sector. Chinese investments were concentrated mostly in the energy, mining, manufacturing, and construction, retail and finance sectors. <sup>28</sup> The following figure shows the Chinese direct investment in Africa, as follow:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Kaplinsky, Raphael and Mike Morris, "Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large Dragons," *European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. (21) No. (4). (2009).



\* Source: Chinese direct investment in Africa, Africa research Institute (IMF), 2013.

The emphasis here varied between countries but investments in large infrastructure projects as well as mining ventures were common across the continent. Chinese investments in small retail outlets ("China shops") are mostly undertaken by private business people and hardly create linkages to the local economy as they source cheap consumer goods from China, which are popular amongst poorer consumers. Chinese construction projects in Africa, on the other hand, are usually carried out by state Owned Enterprises and they often resort to the utilisation of large numbers of Chinese workers. In some cases, like the construction of a stadium in Ghana,

Chinese migrant workers accounted for up to two-thirds of the labour force.<sup>29</sup> African governments due to the offer of trade, aid and investments welcome China's presence in Africa without strings attached. China is also seen as a solution to the creation of local infrastructure where local capacity is lacking. In general, African leaders consider their engagement with China as a viable alternative to the often neo-colonial relations they have had with the West as exemplified by the neo-liberal policies of the Washington Consensus.<sup>30</sup>

# C) AFRICA'S TRADE UNIONS AND CHINESE LABOUR

Following the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) with privatization policies and the resulting mass retrenchments of the 1980s and 1990s, Africa's trade unions are relatively weak and face a host of challenges today. Union membership has declined as labour struggles to recruit and represent nonpermanent workers and those in the informal economy. Employers, including the Chinese, take advantage of flexible labour markets and undermine collective bargaining. Trade unions expect government support for the enforcement of local labour laws and international labour standards but in many countries, host governments are reluctant to intervene for fear of losing foreign investments.<sup>31</sup> Organizing workers and improving their working conditions through direct action and collective bargaining is undoubtedly the most effective way to redress the current problems at Chinese companies. The aggressive union organizing strategy in Zambia, for example, has had some success. In many cases, however, this proves to be very difficult and thus supplementary strategies could be used. These include national minimum wages and basic conditions of employment that are enforced by trade unions and labour inspectors alike. Building alliances aimed at promoting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Kumo, W. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Trends, Opportunities and Challenges, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/87089 February 2, 2009

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Lin, Justin Yifu.. "From Flying Geese to Leading Dragons", UNU-WIDER Lecture, May 4, 2011
 <sup>31</sup> Kaplinsky, R. What does the Rise of China do for Industrialization in Sub Saharan Africa, Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) Publications Ltd., (2008)

Africa wide and sub-regional framework agreements may help to improve working conditions. Furthermore, African trade union bodies as well as the global union federations can take up the labour rights violations at continental level and also bring it to the attention of the All-China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU) in an effort to exert pressure on Chinese companies in Africa. Likewise, unions could use the political linkages to call on the Chinese government to pressurize companies through the Chinese Embassies in Africa. 32

Other steps that might strengthen trade unions' ability to deal with Chinese companies include courses in the Chinese language (Mandarin) for African union organizers, improving the capacity for organizing and negotiations amongst trade unions, translation of documents outlining labour laws and regulations for Chinese companies into Mandarin, broadening the decent work agenda through social dialogue at national and international level and ongoing campaigns for minimum wages and their enforcement. There is a need to develop meaningful exchanges between African and Chinese workers beyond the high-level visits of trade union leaders. Exchange programs must target workers at grassroots level and must be driven by a will to develop joint strategies in the fight against exploitation. Understanding each other's environments and struggles may not only counter racism and divisions but may also pave the way for coordinated actions at international level in future.

The common trends found in most African countries point to the urgent need to develop coherent continental approaches to Chinese companies and foreign investment in general. The current practice of attracting investments "at all costs" has led to a downward spiral in terms of labour and environmental standards. Currently, the relationship between African states and China is not equal and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Large, McCormick and Morris, *The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa*, 291.

requires significant changes to become mutually beneficial. African governments must strengthen their bargaining position and ensure local processing. They must also improve monitoring to ensure that investors do not divert their focus away from manufacturing and that skills and technology transfer actually takes place.<sup>33</sup> There are many problems associated with Chinese companies in Africa should not be seen in isolation from the broader challenge of dealing with the consequences of neoliberal globalization, which places economic growth above all social consideration.<sup>34</sup>

The trade patterns that characterized Africa's relations with Europe and the USA are replicated to a significant extent in the Sino-African relations. Thus, the quality of the economic relations needs to be altered substantially if Africa is to benefit in future. The global economic crisis provides trade unions with an opportunity to intensify advocacy campaigns for alternative policies to the neoliberal agenda with a view of placing redistribution and Africa's development priorities at the center of all external relations.<sup>35</sup>

# II- WORKING RECENT CONDITIONS ANDIAbour RELATIONS AT CHINESE COMPANIES IN AFRICA

Labour relations in Chinese firms in Africa as well as working conditions in China are a cause of disagreement. This is the most controversial aspect of Chinese investments in Africa. It has pitted African workers and their trade unions against Chinese businesspeople and government officials as well as local politicians

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Daniel Poon, *Is China Blocking Africa's Economic Development*?, NSI (The North South Institute, 2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Hart-Landsberg, Martin and Burkett, P. 'China, Capital Accumulation and Labour,' *Monthly Review*, (May 2008)

<sup>35</sup> Guixuan, L. September, *Presentation on Perspectives on China-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation at the 4th Tswalu Dialogue*. Guixuan, L.9 月 5 日 年上介绍的展望中国与非洲经贸合作在第 4 Tswalu 对话。 http://www.chineseembassy.org.za/eng/znjl/t194633.(2009)

who believe that the Sino-African relations are beneficial for Africa, even if working conditions are poor. This was very prominently expressed in Namibia where officials of the Chinese Embassy and Namibian government officials alike called on workers to "suffer now" so that future generations may benefit. Some African countries are not pointing to the same practices in each country, as there were differences between countries, sectors and individual companies. In Nigeria, for example, there were Chinese companies with exemplary working conditions andlabour relations alongside others where workers' rights are frequently abused. However, there were some common trends at Chinese businesses in Africa, which included tenselabour relations, hostile attitudes towards trade unions, various violations of workers' rights, poor working conditions and several instances of discrimination and unfairlabour practices. These incidents are outlined below, drawing on the various country case studies. The researcher here will divide the working conditions surrounded China's companies in Africa into the following sections;

# A) CHINESE COMPANIES GENERAL WORKING CONDITIONS IN AFRICA

A common feature of working conditions at Chinese companies was the absence of employment contracts and the arbitrary determination of wages and benefits by the owners or managers. There was, therefore, no record of employment, which made enforcement of local labour laws difficult. Even in countries with clearly defined legislation and procedures for dispute resolution—for example South Africa—the absence of contracts and records of employment often hindered enforcement. Another common feature was the employment of African workers as "casual workers". Even in countries where labour laws provide for the classification of workers as permanent employees after a few months of employment—such as Angola—Chinese companies tended to continuously treat

African workers as casuals, depriving them of the benefits that they are legally entitled to. There were, however, some cases where strong unions managed to convert casual jobs into permanent ones, for example at a Chinese company that manufactured explosives in Zambia. <sup>36</sup> Despite stipulations in national labour legislation, many Chinese employers ignored the provisions for breaks and forced their workers to either work continuously or with only a very short lunch break. In Malawi, for example, a significant number of workers at Chinese companies had to work for 12 hours without a break. <sup>37</sup>

In related to the wages paid by China's companies are working in Africa, Thus a comparison between the wages paid by Chinese employers and those paid by other employers in the same industry in the same country was carried out. It revealed that Chinese companies tended to pay the lowest wages. In South Africa, Chinese-owned textile companies paid significantly below the country's minimum wage. Likewise, Chinese construction firms in Ghana, Namibia and Angola pay their workers lower wages than local and other foreign firms and in some cases wages were below the applicable sectorial or national minimum standards. In Zambia, the Chinese copper mine paid its workers about 30% less than other copper mines in the country. In Nigeria, on the other hand, some Chinese companies established good labour relations and were paying reasonable wages while others were not. The Nigerian case study further pointed out that in some instances, Indian, Lebanese and Israeli-owned companies were paying even less than the Chinese was.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Hart-Landsberg, Martin and P. Burkett, *'China, Capital Accumulation and Labour,' Monthly Review* (May 2008)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>G. Dobler, South-South Business Relations in Practice: Chinese Merchants, (Oshinkango: Namibia, 2013)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Biacuana.. *Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future*, (Cape Town: Centre for Advanced Studies of African Societies, 2013)

# B) CHINESE COMPANIES AND THE POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION AND UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES IN AFRICA.

The case studies found many instances of discrimination and unfair labour practices. Sexual harassment was found in Namibia and Kenya while all female workers in Malawi were treated as "casuals", thus denying them some of the benefits enjoyed by men. The case studies also found violations of the right to paid maternity leave – even if they were enshrined in national labour legislation such as in Angola. Furthermore, in some countries Chinese employers tended to terminate the employment of female workers once they fell pregnant. These cases constituted violations of basic international workers' rights as well as locally enshrined rights. In South Africa and Namibia, Chinese companies violated the provisions of affirmative action legislation, locally known as "employment equity". Chinese employers seemed ignorant about the legal provisions, which aim to promote the employment and promotion of women, people with disabilities and those citizens who were disadvantaged during the Apartheid era. Chinese companies tended to employ African workers for basic tasks at very low pay while importing Chinese managers and supervisors for higher paid positions. In Zambia, there was a clear case of discrimination as local managers earned substantially less than their Chinese counterparts – even when carrying out similar tasks at the same company. The same trend was observed in Kenya. Overall, the labour relations at Chinese companies in Africa were found to be poor, characterized by widespread abuse of workers' rights.<sup>39</sup>

In blatant violation of local labour laws, most Chinese companies denied African workers annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave and compassionate leave. In some instances, workers went on leave and then discovered that they were not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Chan-Fishel (2007) *Environmental impact: more of the same?*, In Manji and Marks (eds), African perspectives on China in Africa. (Nairobi: Oxford, 2007)

paid for the leave period. In "Angola", many female workers at Chinese companies were unaware of their right to paid maternity leave and as a result worked until they gave birth and 67 returned to work shortly afterwards. "Ghanaian workers" were also not aware of their right to have paid annual leave and thus worked at Chinese construction companies without taking leave. Another frequent problem was the accommodation provided to workers. This applied particularly to construction companies, which often carried out projects in remote areas and thus had to provide accommodation for their staff on site. In most cases, workers complained bitterly about the quality of accommodation with overcrowding and lack of ablution facilities being common problems. <sup>40</sup>

A particularly grave case of workers' rights violations was the "locking-in" of workers during working hours. They were unable to leave the factory premises even during break times and thus their basic right of freedom of movement was violated. In Malawi, such practices also placed workers at an enormous personal risk as was demonstrated during several tragic events. In Nigeria, for example, a fire while locked inside a Chinese rubber and plastic factory killed 20 workers. In Kenya, 29 workers that had been locked up were killed when their factory caught fire in 2007. In some instances, Chinese companies used virtual slave labour that they obtained through international labour brokers. This was reported from Botswana where a Chinese national had to work for Zheng Ming Knitwear in forced labour without pay. Cases of physical assault and verbal abuse were reported at Chinese firms in Malawi.<sup>41</sup>

# III- LABOUR CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS IN CHINESE COMPANIES IN AFRICA

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> M. Chidaushe, China's grand re-entrance into Africa - mirage or oasis?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Giles, B., Aid and Other Dirty China's Business in Africa. (Ebury Press: 2008)

Most controversial issues afflicting the Africa-China relationship, the general perception is that Chinese companies drag down labour standards by bringing their own workers on overseas projects and by exploiting local workers that they do hire. Yet, the lack of systematic research and data availability on Chinese investments and economic activities makes it very difficult to isolate the impacts of these on African labour markets either vis-à-vis other investors, or in the conduct of domestic macro-economic governance. For example, in 2006 UNIDO published a survey of 1216 foreign firms (Chinese, Indian, South African, and Western investors) operating in 15 African countries. 42 The survey found that Chinese firms were younger, had lower sales per worker (but with higher sales growth), had a greater propensity to export, and had lower investment rates and lower annual wages. Surveyed Chinese firms were mostly focused on exportoriented low-wage assembly operations, but also hired a higher proportion of low-skilled local workers. 43

A recent report by the African Labour Research Network (ALRN) conducting 10 country case studies suggests significant variation across Chinese business practices, which cannot be generalized across the board. For instance, Chinese construction projects in Angola tend to have a higher ratio of imported Chinese labourers, where local labour is more expensive. In other countries, like Namibia, Chinese construction projects often have a majority of locally employed labour, with Chinese nationals clustered in management positions.<sup>44</sup> (The African Labour Research Network "ALRN". 2010). This is also the case in Botswana,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>UNIDO Survey: Foreign Firms Operating in 15 African Countries, 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Kaplinsky, Raphael and Mike Morris "Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large Dragons", *European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. (21) No. (4). (2009)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> The African Labour Research Network "ALRN" (2010).

where Chinese construction companies employed about 700 Chinese nationals (engineers, managers, experts, etc.) and about 5,270 locals, as reported in 2008.<sup>45</sup>

According to Brautigam, with few exceptions, field research on Chinese construction projects regularly reported having a majority of locals in their workforce; the poor conditions of this employment being the major point of contention. Overall, the (ALRN) report does point to some common trends in Chinese labour practices in Africa, including: tenselabour relations, hostile attitudes towards trade unions, various violations of workers' rights, poor working conditions and several instances of discrimination and unfairlabour practices. The report indicates that almost all of the local workers are employed as unskilled casual workers, without a single worker being given a contract of employment, often tasked with the construction of temporary structures.<sup>46</sup>

In terms of wages, Chinese construction firms in Ghana, Namibia and Angola were reported to pay their workers lowers wages than local and foreign firms and in some cases below the relevant industry or national minimum standards. In Zambia, the company NFC Africa Mining Plc, which is majority-owned by state-owned China Nonferrous Metals Co., was reported to be the lowest payer in terms of salaries/wages in the domestic mining sector. The report indicates that Zambian unions have gained important inroads in negotiating with Chinese management to narrow, and in some cases eliminate, the gap in general conditions between unionized workers in Chinese and non-Chinese companies, including improving workers' benefits on par with non-Chinese copper mines. However, casual workers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Brautigam. "Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective", (India: Center for Chinese studies, 2011)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Anthony Yaw and Herbert Jaunch (eds.). "*Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective*", (Cape Town: African Labour Research Network, 2009)

are not included in the collective agreement and this remains an area of concern. <sup>47</sup>The following figure indicates China's work sector in Africa.

Figure (3): Chinese exports and market share in Africa

KEY CHINESE EXPORTS TO AFRICA		
Relatively fast growth in 2013	Large size of sales	Market share in Africa
Wood and pulp products (16%)	Machinery and mechanical appliances (USD23bn)	Textiles (70%)
Prepared foodstuff (13%)	Textiles (USD16bn)	Footwear (70%)
Stone, plaster, cement (12%)	Base metals and articles (USD10bn)	Hides and skins (65%)
Footwear (11%)	Transport equipment USD9bn)	Stone, plaster, cement (48%)
Machinery and appliances (11%)	Plastics and rubber (USD6bn)	Plastics and rubber (22%)
Base metals and articles (9%)	Footwear and headgear (USD5bn)	Machinery and appliances (20%)
	Relatively fast growth in 2013  Wood and pulp products (16%)  Prepared foodstuff (13%)  Stone, plaster, cement (12%)  Footwear (11%)  Machinery and appliances (11%)  Base metals and	Relatively fast growth in 2013  Wood and pulp products (16%)  Prepared foodstuff (13%)  Stone, plaster, cement (12%)  Footwear (11%)  Machinery and articles (USD10bn)  Transport equipment USD9bn)  Machinery and appliances (11%)  Machinery and appliances (11%)  Base metals and  Footwear and  Footwear and

<sup>\*</sup> Source: Standard Bank Group, 2014.

This figure shows us the growing of China's work sector and companies in Africa, and Of course, that will lead to the growing African workers are working there. The non-adherence to African national labour laws or core ILO conventions is not confined to Chinese employers and investors, and this generally remains a problem among non-Chinese employers as well. As such, concerns regarding Chinese labour practices are usually accompanied by recognition of the lack of government institutional capacity and resources to effectively inspect workplaces and to enforce compliance. <sup>48</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Anthony Yaw and Herbert Jaunch (eds.) "Chinese Investments in *Labour Research Network*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Baah, Anthony Yaw and Herbert Jaunch (eds.) "Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective."

Similarly, a Human Rights Watch report on Chinese labour practices in the Zambian copper mining industry argued that companies (whether Chinese or otherwise) face few disincentives for violating labour and safety regulations, and ultimately stresses that "the question is thus enforcement. Under the previous administration, Zambia's regulations were only strong on paper."<sup>49</sup>

# IV- THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS TO RESPOND CHINESE VIOLATIONS TO THE AFRICAN WORKERS RIGHTS

The benefits offered at Chinese companies varied but were usually confined to those that are compulsory by law. Chinese companies even ignored those provisions and paid their workers merely a basic wage. Workers were provided with transport or a transport allowance and incentive bonuses. Other benefits such as a pension scheme, medical aid or a housing allowance were virtually unheard of. The conditions of Chinese staff tended to be quite different as they enjoyed higher wages and significantly more benefits. Chinese companies denied African workers annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave and compassionate leave. Quality of accommodation with overcrowding and lack of ablution facilities being common problems. Therefore, the researcher here indicates some facts regarding the Chinese companies' relationship with the African trade unions, as the following

- Union-bashing strategies by Chinese
- Collective bargaining was rare at Chinese companies in Africa Unions complained that negotiations with Chinese employers are painfully slow and tedious because they claim to take. In some countries such as Namibia and South Africa, workers expressed doubts about the ability of trade unions to represent them effectively and to protect their rights while in other countries,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> (Report: HRW. 2011)

such as Angola and Malawi, many workers never had any contact with trade unions .  $^{50}$ 

- Chinese businesses were openly or indirectly supported by host governments who defended Chinese investments against the demands of labour.
- Unionisation of workers on short-term employment contracts, as in many construction projects, is complicated and tedious.
- No or limited social protection unions have achieved for workers.
- Across Africa Chinese refused to join local employers' associations

#### HOW HAVE AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS BEEN RESPONDING.

The acceleration of Chinese investments in Africa has come at the time many African trade unions are facing very difficult challenges. Unions in many sub-Saharan African countries have not recovered from the membership and financial losses they suffered in the 1990s because of the IMF/World Banksponsored policies of mass lay-off of their members in the public sector as well as the privatization of state enterprises. In most African countries, public sector workers constitute the majority of trade union membership. The retrenchment and privatization policies, therefore, had very devastating effects on unions. The combined effects of privatization and mass retrenchment policies were the drastic decline of union membership across Africa in the 1990s. In Ghana, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) lost nearly a quarter of its membership during that period and has since not recovered fully from the losses. An affiliate of the Ghana TUC, the National Union of Seamen (NUS), lost over 80 percent of its members when Ghana's state owned shipping line, the Black Star Line, was privatized. The same policies were implemented in Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda and many other sub-Saharan African countries with similar effects on trade unions. Consequently,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> C. Finamore, The Role of African Trade Unions towards China in *China in Spotlight*, (2009).

unions were deprived of their main source of income, i.e. membership subscriptions, and have remained weak <sup>.51</sup> Here, the researcher will indicate some cases of African trade unions intervention confronting the Chinese companies as the following:

# IN GHANA

- Unions lodged complaints with officials of the Chinese Embassy in Ghana.
- Unions lodged several complaints of labour right violations by Chinese contractors with the National Labour Commission (NLC) – the body charged with the responsibility of preventing and settling industrial disputes.
- Unions currently collabourating with its Nigerian counterparts to develop a common (regional) approach to deal with the special challenges posed by Chinese investors in both countries.
- Union has reported the unfair labour practices in Chinese companies in the construction sector to government through the ministry responsible for works and housing.
- Union also suggested that government should promote labour standards in the
  procurement process so that Chinese investors would be aware of these
  standards and regulations even before the take up contracts in the country.
- African Unions call to form alliances with community based organisations and possibly boycott products made by Chinese firms that do not comply with labour standards.
- Unions using the ILO core standards and the national labour laws as basis for mobilisation communities and workers against poor working conditions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Hart-Landsberg, Martin and Burkett, P. 'China, Capital Accumulation and Labour', Monthly Review. (2008)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> (Report: International Confederation of free Trade Unions. 2006).

#### IN MALAWI

- Unions embarked on a more aggressive organizing campaign including educational campaigns on radio to encourage workers to exercise their rights to join or form unions of their choice.
- Unions are also encouraging the Employers Consultative Association of Malawi (ECAM) to extend their membership to cover the Chinese employers.
- Unions have raised concerns on working conditions in Chinese companies in their national tripartite dialogue. <sup>53</sup>

#### **IN NAMIBIA**

Namibian trade unions are experiencing many challenges in their dealings with Chinese companies. Workers interviewed in Namibia, as part of this study, put the blame at the doorstep of the Namibian government for the labour rights violations in Chinese companies. They argued that government has the power to protect Namibian workers but it refuses to do so because 72 of the fear that Namibia may lose foreign investors if labour laws are strictly enforced. The Metal and Allied Namibia Workers' Union (MANWU) proposes the setting up of a committee made up of representatives of all stakeholders including the union and ministries in charge of works and labour to monitor compliance with labour standards in the construction sector. At the time of the study, preparations were under way to set up a Council for the Construction Industry. <sup>54</sup>

# IN SOUTH AFRICA

Initially, the unions were able to organize workers easily. However, the Chinese companies started adopting a wide range of strategies to frustrate unions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> R. Kaplinsky, What does the Rise of China do for Industrialization in Sub Saharan Africa?, *Review of African Political Economy* (U.K: ROAPE Publications Ltd. 2008)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> McCormick and Morris, The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa, 291.

For example, they started employing workers on short-term contracts. Workers who join trade unions risk not having their contracts renewed. Workers are, therefore, reluctant to join unions because they have been made to believe that unions are ineffective in protecting their rights and interests.<sup>55</sup>

The financial difficulties facing unions have had negative impact on their recruitment drives and their capacity to effectively engage employers and government. The situation has worsened due to the growing informalisation of employment. As a part of the structural adjustment programs, African governments were forced by the international financial institutions to implement labour law reforms with the objective of attracting and retaining foreign investors. Consequently, some categories of workers are, by law, not allowed to form or join unions. In Ghana, the current labour law that came into effect in 2003 bars the police, the fire service, and the prison service from forming or joining trade unions. Even those who are allowed to form unions, some categories of workers, the so-called "essential workers", are not allowed to embark on strike action. For example, all health workers in Ghana are, by law, not allowed to strike. Employers in Ghana are allowed to terminate the employment of their workers without any reason. This has resulted in the creation of less secure jobs and incomes.<sup>56</sup>

# V- EVALUATION OF CHINA'S LABOUR MARKETS IN AFRICA

The importance of the "Sino-African" relations has increased significantly over the past few years and this trend is set to continue. At an economic level, the challenges of shaping the Sino-Africa relations for Africa's long-term benefits are far greater. African workers have withstood the worst of labour relations and practices that are simply unacceptable. African workers who experienced Chinese

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Lummumba-Kasango. China-Africa Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Dialectics of Rethinking South- South Dialogue in *CODESRIA bulletin*, No.(2), (2007), 8-16.

businesspeople as the new colonizers who treated workers in the same exploitative and condescending manner like the former expressed this. Trade unions across the continent have expressed deep concerns about the way they and their members are treated by Chinese companies. African trade unions are aware of the threat of being rendered useless if they cannot stop exploitative practices at Chinese and other companies.<sup>57</sup> Therefore, the researcher tries to evaluate the impact of China's labour markets in Africa, as the following

- China's current interest in Africa is not new
- Chinese history and archaeological evidence in East Africa, indicates that its trade relationship with Africa dates back to very ancient decades
- China's "socialist market economy" with a strategic commercial agenda in Africa
- Africa's main exports are minerals, petroleum and timber
- Africa's main imports are capital and consumer goods
- South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa
- Absence of employment contracts and the arbitrary determination of wages and benefits by the Chinese Managers
- No record of employment, which made enforcement of local labour laws difficult. <sup>58</sup>
- Employment as casual workers
- Low wages and almost no benefits
- Violations of minimum wage agreements

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Li. *Social Harmony and Stability in Sino-Africa ties today*, Social Sciences Academic Press. 李 2008) **在中非的社会和**谐与稳定联系在一起的今天,社会科学文献出版社

<sup>58</sup> Lin, Edwin. (2014). "Big Fish in a Small Pond": Chinese Migrant Shopkeepers in Africa". International Migration Review, Vol. (48), No. (1), P.P. 181–215. 澳林,埃德温。(2014 年 "大鱼在一个小池塘":中国在非洲的移民店主"。国际移民评论、卷。48),第(1),P.P. 181-215

- · Better conditions for Chinese staff
- Violations of some ILO Core Conventions
- Lack of enforcement of labour standards
- Several of the core ILO conventions were frequently violated by Chinese employers (rights to join trade unions, to bargain collectively, to receive equal remuneration and to be protected against discrimination).
- Basic rights such as paid leave were often ignored and forced overtime work (often without additional compensation) occurred in several countries.
- Workers worked longer hours without any extra pay fearing dismissal. In Zimbabwe, most workers at Chinese companies were simply forced to work overtime and in Ghana workers at a Chinese construction site were simply told to work 9 -12 hours per day for seven days per week in contravention of the national labour law. <sup>59</sup>
- Locking-in of workers during working hours. They were unable to leave the factory premises even during break times and thus their basic right of freedom of movement was violated. In Malawi, the Chinese companies there were locked the workers inside the factory during their lunch break. In Nigeria, for example, a fire while locked inside a Chinese rubber and plastic factory killed 20 workers. In Kenya, 29 workers who had been locked up were killed when their factory caught fire in 2007. 60

Cases of physical assault and verbal abuse were reported at Chinese firms in Malawi. So, according to the above mentioned, the researcher concluded the following aspects, as follows: Current China-Africa relationship is unequal and needs to be altered sig\znificantly. Africa must negotiate local processing and respectlabour standards. African governments have to set their own strategic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>Rachel Bright, *Chinese Labour in South Africa*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Yap, Melanie & Leong Man, Dainne, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in Africa*. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996),510.

agenda and negotiate better deals with investors from China and elsewhere. Chinese companies are just one aspect of globalization and Africa needs qualitatively different economic relations with the outside world. Need to identify the forms and operations of key institutional relationships that are keys to the success of developmental states in specific countries in Africa.<sup>61</sup>

Regarding the suitable way should be adopted by the African trade unions in confronting the China's violations to the Africanlabours; the researcher recommends the following aspects to promote the nature work in the African trade unions. Need to continuously and consciously build the capacities of trade unions. To work out a plan for advocacy and dialogue with the appropriate institutions. To form strategic alliances with other actors of civil society. Establish strategic and issue based political alliances. Leverage existing policy space through sub-regional trade unions. Coordinating polices with the Continental and International global Unions and Ensure enforced monitoring &evaluation of all development Policies.

#### **CONCLUSION:**

The researcher concluded the Chinese labour force in Africa by answering this question: Is China blocking African development. While there is evidence that Chinese investors are negatively affecting labour standards in some African countries, this is not a uniformly one-dimensional story. Other factors, such as domestic macroeconomic fundamentals and labour market conditions are important policy framework considerations, as well as the impact of other foreign investors, and the institutional capacity of domestic governments to enforce their own labour laws and regulations. China has been active in Africa. Hundreds of major Chinese businesses and tens of thousands of Chinese labourers, are found in all parts of the African continent. This policy brief delves into the critical question of whether

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Wonacott, Peter. China Inc. Moves Factory Floor to Africa, *The Wall Street Journal*. May 14, 2014

China's economic development is blocking that of Africa's, and the extent that relations with China reduce or expand the degree of policy autonomy of African countries. This brief focuses on two controversial policy areas: labour standards and industrial development.

The entry of Chinese firms and companies into Africa poses several challenges not only to local and foreign contractors operating in Africa but also to the African Workers and trade African Unions there. With regard to wages and working conditions, the union argues that the Chinese appear to have the notion that they can operate in Africa with whatever system of labour relations in China. They are therefore very reluctant to adhere to existing labour relations practices in the African states. When they are pushed, the Chinese management only accepts the minimum standards provided by law. This practice greatly undermines whatever gains the union might have made as far as social protection for its members is concerned. Dealing with these challenges has stretched both the financial and human resources of the African trade unions that should have taken a number of steps to address the concerns of workers in the Chinese companies to discuss the poor labour practices of Chinese firms in Africa.

# DISPARITY IN RELATIVE THREATS PERCEPTION AND ITS IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY:

# A CASE STUDY OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

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#### **ABSTRACT**

The rise of China and India, in the context of great-power competition, is undeniably a cardinal feature of contemporary global politics. To provide a new perspective for understanding Sino-Indian relations, the research draws on evidence from interactions between China and India over the past few decades to make an empirical case for the existence and impact of disparity in relative threats perception between both the states. A plethora of outstanding issues in Sino-Indian relations, such as the border dispute, the Tibet issue, nuclear proliferation, and their relations in the regional and global context, are examined. The research observes that the Sino-Indian relations have been constrained by the disparity in their threat perceptions: India tends to be profoundly apprehensive of the threats emanating from China, while China tends to be relatively unperturbed by the threats with regard to India. This asymmetry, the research concludes, has made it difficult for China and India to forge shared knowledge and to set a common agenda around which their expectations could converge. New Delhi is on an unrelenting pursuit for changes in Sino-Indian relations, such as the resolution of the border dispute and securing a more credible nuclear deterrent against China. On the contrary, Beijing is inclined towards maintaining the status quo, and feels no dire need to resolve the contemporary disputes. As an implication, the disparity in relative threats perception has been a destabilizing factor in Sino-Indian relations.

**KEYWORDS:** great-power competition, border dispute, Tibet issue, nuclear proliferation, status quo, credible nuclear deterrent

# INTRODUCTION

The bilateral relations between China and India occupy the center stage in South Asian politics and have been characterized by relentless tensions and border disputes, resulting in three military conflicts – the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Chola incident of 1967, and the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish. In early 2017, the two countries clashed at the Doklam plateau along the disputed Sino-Bhutanese border. <sup>62</sup> In May 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a series of skirmishes along the border, spurred on by an Indian road construction project in the Ladakh region. Nonetheless, since the late 1980s, both the countries have been successful in reinvigorating diplomatic and economic ties. In 2008, China became India's largest trading partner and the two countries have extended their strategic and military relations. Apart from trade and commerce, there are some other areas of mutual interest on which China and India have been cooperating of late. In the words of Rejaul Karim Laskar, a scholar of Indian foreign policy, "Currently, the two countries are cooperating on a range of international like trade, climate change and reform of the global financial order, among others, to promote common interest".63

Most studies about Sino-Indian relations emphasize the boundary dispute. Some blame China's ambition to expand its territory as the cause of the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations, while others blame India for misconduct or failure in foreign-policymaking. However, the conclusions of various writers are irreconcilable with those of others. The current study aims to critically analyses the determinants framing the nature of relations between India and China while ensuring internal validity of the research. It takes into consideration the actual factors curbing the amiable relations between both the states. Additionally, by applying and focusing on threat perception as an analytical approach, the research

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Rejaul Laskar, "Promoting National Interest Through Diplomacy," *Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist 1, no. 9* (December 2013).

aims to highlight the importance of the used framework in related case studies, thus ensuring the external validity of the research. The main objective of the study is to proclaim the fact that asymmetrical threat perceptions have been curbing amiable relations between India and China.

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Most of the studies about Sino-Indian relations are based on "mainstream" international relations theory, neorealism and neoliberalism. The underlying premise is that, just like other states, China and India are driven to secure the support of other powers to maximize their interests in a condition of anarchy. Treating national interests as exogenously determined, the realists often ignore the possibility of cooperation between states, and fail to explain or predict the reengagement between Beijing and New Delhi in the post-Cold War era. Many studies have assumed that any improvement of relations between the two sides would involve a settlement of the boundary problem. <sup>64</sup> Belying such arguments, China and India have agreed to expand contacts and cooperation in many fields with a high frequency of government-to-government exchanges and a significant increase in bilateral trade, even if there is still no foreseeable final solution to the border dispute. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up considerable space for alternative theoretical perspectives as the "mainstream" theory failed to comprehend adequately the systematic transformation.65

In order to address this issue and offer some fresh insight into this topic, this research will take account of the constructivist understanding of international relations in order to develop an alternative approach to that of the existing literature.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Manoj Joshi, "Doklam: To start at the very beginning," ORF Special Report. <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/doklam-start-very-beginning/">https://www.orfonline.org/research/doklam-start-very-beginning/</a> (2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Scott Burchill, *Theories of International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) 101-107.

Thus, the constraints to the development of Sino-Indian relations will be studied in terms of mutual perceptions and expectations, particularly the perception of threat.

#### THREAT PERCEPTION AS AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH

Regarding perception studies, Robert Jervis has identified perception as a variable in analyzing international politics and foreign policies. He explored the process of perception and identified common forms of misperception, which are perceptions of centralization, overestimating one's importance as influence and target, the influence of desire and fears on perception, and cognitive dissonance.<sup>66</sup> His pioneer study has thus provided a foundation in this area. This research tries to narrow the focus on the perception of threat to understand China-India interactions. The threat perception refers to perceived intent and perceived capability of an opponent. In this study, threat perception is defined as an expectation of harm to assets or values of the state.<sup>67</sup> The loss or damage caused by a perceived threat might be in the areas of military, economy, strategy, national sovereignty and national prestige.<sup>68</sup>

There are three major sources of threat perception. The first one is historical enmity. States tend to rely on experiences and interactions to forecast how other states will behave. As David Singer states, historical memories easily help to transform vague suspicion into concrete hostility. <sup>69</sup> Moreover, the existence of historical enmity will often amplify present perceptions of threat. <sup>70</sup> The second

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 82-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Zeev Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 133-134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> David A. Baldwin, "Thinking about Threat." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution XV*, no. 1 (May 1971): 71-78.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> J. David Singer, "Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, no. 1 (1958).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 51.

source of threat perception is the sense of separate identity. Since a state's identity informs its interests and preference, states, which do not hold a shared identity, are uncertain as to each other's intentions and plots. On the contrary, a sense of shared identity can reduce the perception of threat.<sup>71</sup> A power gap between the competing states is the third major source of the threat perception. A substantial gap in power between the competing states will increase the sense of insecurity for the state with less power.

# RATIONALIZING THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH: THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Paying more attention to the interactive culture between China and India, the first aim of the research is to point out the existence of an asymmetrical threat perception. India tends to be deeply apprehensive about the threats from China, while China appears comparatively unconcerned about the threat from India. Such an asymmetry is both apparent and remarkable, especially considering that India and China share a similar type of international identity: both are big and populous developing countries and regional powers with considerable economic, military and political potential.

The second contention in this study is that Sino-Indian relations are constrained by the asymmetry of their threat perceptions. Stephen M. Walt's "balance of threat" theory argues that states aim for balance against perceived threats rather than against the most powerful states. A perceived threat could therefore affect a state's behavior and preference in dealings with its counterpart state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> David L. Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 57-58.

In general, China does not perceive India as a serious security threat, it considers the status quo to be favorable and wants to maintain the status quo between the two states. On the contrary, India perceives China as a serious security and tries to reduce the sense of insecurity by adopting countermeasures, such as developing nuclear weapons, allying itself with other countries, or constructive CBMs.

#### THE INTRACTABLE BORDER DISPUTE IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

The China-India border covers a distance of some two thousand kilometers, which is divided into three sections: the eastern, middle, and western sectors. The western sector involves the boundary between Kashmir in India, and Xinjiang and Tibet in China. The middle sector runs from the Kashmir-Tibet-Punjab border junction to the Tibet-Nepal-Uttar Pradesh border junction, while the eastern sector starts at the junction of the China-India-Bhutan border and extends to the junction of the China-Myanmar-India border.

Both sides generally concur on the alignment of the middle sector, but profound disagreement remains regarding the western and eastern sectors. With regard to the western sector, New Delhi accuses China of occupying around 38,000 km<sup>2</sup> of the Indian Territory in the western sector, in addition to 5,180 square kilometres ceded to China by Pakistan under the 1963 China-Pakistan boundary accord. In the western sector, India contends that Aksai Chin is part of India's Ladakh area, but it has been occupied by China as part of its autonomous region Xinjiang since the 1950s. In the eastern sector, the Chinese claim about 90,000 km<sup>2</sup> in Arunachal Pradesh area of India and repudiate the McMahon Line, which has been considered the China-India boundary by the Indian side.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Random House, 2000), 33-37.

#### LEGACY OF THE BORDER DISPUTE/1962 SINO-INDIAN WAR

In October 1962, the incompatible claims of the two sides over the disputed territory along the border resulted in a short but significant war and strained India-China relations. Diplomatic relations at the ambassador level were cut off and were restored only in 1976.<sup>73</sup> The two states have tried to use dialogue in order to resolve the border problem since 1981. Various kinds of official dialogue mechanisms have been proposed, including the eight rounds of vice-minister talks between 1981 and 1987, the Joint Working Group (JWG) Meetings, and the Expert Group; the latest are Special Representative Meetings.<sup>74</sup>

Although the Tibet issue had led to the deterioration in China-India ties, it was the border dispute that eventually destroyed the "bhai bhai" friendship between both the states. The deadlock that followed the border problem ruined the mutual trust. The importance of the boundary issue in Sino-Indian relations was well-recognized, as it was seen as the main obstacle to improving bilateral relations. More importantly, the border dispute and the consequent war led to the disparity in relative threats perception between the two sides. It is conspicuous that the Indian policy makers deemed China as a potential rival after the 1962 war.<sup>75</sup>

# RENEWED BORDER TALKS

While the border dispute became a serious issue between both China and India, Beijing was endeavoring to sign accords with Myanmar and Nepal in 1960, Mongolia in 1962, and Pakistan in 1963. India's suspicion of China deepened

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Steven Hoffman, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 64.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Random House, 2000), 33-37.

because of China's overt nuclearization in October 1964. Tensions continued, as there were episodes of irregular fighting along the border in 1965 and 1967. Moreover, to China's despair, India annexed Sikkim during 1973-1975 and instigated disharmony between both the states.

Between June 1981 and November 1987, eight rounds of talks were conducted at the vice-ministerial level to settle the boundary question, but little progress was made. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested that China and India could adopt a "one package deal" to solve the border dispute when the then India's Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Beijing in February 1979. The package deal asserted that China would accept the border claimed by India in the eastern part of the border, namely, the McMahon Line, in return for India's acceptance of the status quo in the western part of the border. Since then, the package deal has become one of China's basic principles to settle the longstanding boundary conflict in Sino-Indian relations. On the other hand, India refused to accept the package deal and supported a separate negotiation of each sector's border, taking into account the specific aspects of each. The Indian side insisted on minor territorial adjustments in the eastern sector and China's unilateral concession in the western sector.

Since each side merely reiterated its well-known position on the border problem and then dispersed, the eight rounds of border negotiations that were held from 1981 to 1987 did not lead to a breakthrough. The only achievement was that both the states agreed on maintaining peace along the frontier and that the boundary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Shen Junzhuan, *The proces and obstacles in the normalization of Sino-Indian Relations* (Taipei: National Chengchi University, 1987), 176-177.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Xuecheng Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 141.

conflict should be resolved through peaceful negotiations. However, these talks did not prevent the two countries from engaging in border clashes in 1986-87.

#### CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

On 23 December 1988, the Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique was issued that aimed at seeking the resolution of India-China boundary question. However, the Joint Working Group (JWG) focused on CBMS that could ensure peace in the disputed areas, instead of focusing on initiatives that could resolve the border dispute. Aware of the intricacy of the dispute, both the states avoided rushing into a border agreement, but aimed at creating a favourable atmosphere conducive to an ultimate resolution of the dispute.

Some Chinese scholars have claimed that the early proposal to adopt the CBMs was initiated by the Chinese side in the late 1950s. They argue that in November 1962, the Chinese were the first who suggested that the military personnel of both India and China should retreat twenty kilometers from the LAC, and not send armed personnel into the disputed areas. Factually, however, it might be too simple to conclude that the Sino-Indian CBMs could be agreed in the early days. It was observed that Beijing began to embrace the concept and recognise the worth of CBMs only after the mid-1980s with the relaxation of the international situation, increasing economic interdependence and the launch of domestic economic reform.<sup>78</sup> China's economic progress necessitates a peaceful peripheral environment; this applies in equal measure to India. Thus, Sino-Indian CBMs are due to both the states seeking a harmonious environment to concentrate on the objective of nation building.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Rosemary Foot, "Chinese-Indian relations and the process of building confidence implications for the Asia-Pacific," *The Pacific Review* 9, no. I (1996).

Although the CBMs contributed to maintaining the status quo along the border, the JWG meetings were not able to frame any possible solution proposal for the border dispute. The CBMs did not generate enough confidence to satisfy New Delhi. After India's overt nuclearization in May 1998, Beijing was shocked by India's justification of the nuclear tests based on the security threat from China. The Sino-Indian relations hit the lowest point after Pokhran-II despite the diplomatic efforts that were conducted in an attempt to avoid further conflict along the disputed border.

# DISPARITY IN THE SENSE OF URGENCY

The Indian side has been aware of China's reluctance to make any further compromise to quicken the boundary process. China defends its position by stressing that it has so far maintained a positive attitude in seeking solutions to the border issue, and blames New Delhi for the negligible advancement in the India-China border negotiations. The Chinese side argues that India has been anxious to settle the boundary question on its own terms and was averse to settling the matter based on mutual accommodation. It is obvious that the Chinese leadership remains loyal to the "time and patience" principle despite the fact that they have promised to accelerate the negotiation process. In fact, China's approach towards the boundary problem has been more consistent than has India's. The basic reason for this is that China does not deem the unresolved boundary problem as a profound security threat and as a result, has the patience to wait for a more beneficial solution. China's strategy remains to maintain cordial relations in other fields in order to create an environment more conducive to solving the dispute. On the contrary, the Indian side looks with misgivings at the disputed border and worries that China could use the unsolved border problem to bully India. In addition, India is keen to wipe out the displeasing history of the border dispute by concluding the border issue. Due to the asymmetrical concerns, an early solution to the boundary problem is more important to India.

### CHINA'S EMPHASIS ON PACKAGE PROPOSAL

One of the underlying reason for China's apathy toward an early border resolution is that China sees no indication that India is going to accept China's package proposal. China's official report on its foreign relations argued that China had already proposed the "one package deal" to solve the border dispute. The package proposal was later renewed as an approach of "mutual understanding and mutual accommodation" by the Chinese. While "mutual understanding" calls for both sides to understand the other side's position, "mutual accommodation" means there should be a "give-and-take" approach for settling the border dispute. Thus, "if one side hopes to get a piece of land from the other, it should offer a proper piece of land to the other." In 2002, during a state-visit to India, the then Premier of China Zhu Rongji contended that the historical issues Sino-Indian relations could be sorted out gradually through mutual accommodation. Through the package proposal, the Chinese said, they were willing to make some concessions in the eastern part of the border in return for India's concessions in the western part of the border. The so-called package proposal seemed to be pragmatic and a mutually beneficial resolution of the border problem. For China, it could have secured Aksai Chin in the eastern part of the border. Moreover, India could have legalized its possession of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern part of the border. However, the proposal for the mutual ceding of territory was rejected by India.<sup>79</sup>

The disagreement on the package deal has been identified as the main obstacle to the eight rounds of boundary negotiations in the 1980s. The Chinese seem to be confident that the "mutual accommodation" deal is the only possible

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> J. Lall, *Aksaichin and the Sino-Indian Conflict* (Ahmedabad: Allied Publishers, 1989), 213.

approach to solving the border dispute. On this point, however, Beijing underestimates the pressure that a democratically elected government has to face in dealing with any territorial "concession".<sup>80</sup>

A study of China's negotiating behavior has concluded that the Chinese tend to postpone indefinitely negotiations that they consider unfavorable, and show steadfast patience in maintaining their positions. Since the border dispute cannot be resolved on terms favorable to China, the Chinese have shown a tendency to freeze the issue in order to protect their own interests.

#### THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

After China conducted its first nuclear test explosion in October 1964, it opened up a new dimension in the bilateral relations with India. New Delhi had tried to appeal to the US and the UK for some form of protection from China's nuclear threat, but had failed to achieve any reassurance. The failure to achieve a satisfactory solution to its security concerns clearly spurred India's commitment to move more surely down the road to nuclear weaponisation. In May 1998, India finally discarded its traditional stance and conducted five rounds of nuclear test explosions. Unlike the 1974 tests, its rationale for exploding nuclear devices brought a new and more significant nuclear dimension to Sino-Indian relations.

For Beijing, an India equipped with nuclear weapons presented a very different challenge. India's possession of nuclear weapons altered the hard power structure and played a decisive role in building up a new military balance between both the states. Moreover, New Delhi's new identity as a nuclear power reshaped the ideational structure between both the states. Chinese leaders were not only in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Jay Taylor, *The Dragon and the Wild Goose: China and India* (London: Greenwood, 1987), 144-145.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Atish Sinha, & Madhup Mohta, *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), 114.

dire need to reassess the implications of nuclear India's challenge to its security environment, but also needed to consider India's enhanced international status derived from its possession of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Beijing also had to deal with the "China threat" theory used by Indian strategic planners and to justify India's move against the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Of particular concerns to Beijing is the ways in which its expectations about developing Sino-Indian relations were shattered and rejected by the Indian side. Facing the new situation, China felt obliged to re-evaluate and reconstruct its India policy. Although China and India showed a willingness and a capability to manage the diplomatic aftershock of India's nuclear tests, suspicions and distrust still remained.

# THE TIBETAN CONFLICT AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Since the incorporation of Tibet into China in May 1951, it has become a matter of concern in Sino-Indian relations. However, it is not as contentious an issue as the vexatious border dispute, the China-Pakistan politico-economic and geostrategic nexus and the vertical nuclear proliferation between the two states. India acknowledged China's suzerainty over Tibet in 1954 when it signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region. Although both the states are not inclined towards an outright confrontation over Tibet issue, an air of mistrust persists between the two states.

China has repeatedly asserted that Tibet is a matter of internal affairs and if India abides by the Panchsheel Treaty, it would not be a matter of concern in their mutual relations.<sup>83</sup> However, India's duplications management of the situation and its moral support for the exiled Tibetans have raised concerns regarding its sincerity. Moreover, India has been unable to quell anti-China campaign in India

<sup>82</sup> P.C. Chakravarti, *India-China Relations* (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyar, 1961), 79.

<sup>83</sup> Girlal Jain, Panchsheela and After (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960), 47-48.

by the exiled Tibetans. The development of military arsenal in Tibet by the military strategists in China has aggravated the security concerns of their counterparts in India.<sup>84</sup>

Although India is concerned about the security threat that emanates from the incorporation of Tibet into China, it is ambivalent regarding the utilization of Tibet card against the Chinese government. It continues to limit anti-China campaign by the exiled Tibetans in India and supports the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The reason behind this cautious policy is the fear that China will retaliate against India. However, a number of Indian policy makers continue to assert the strategic importance of the Tibet card.<sup>85</sup>

As absolute independence in Tibet is improbable, India has sought ways to realize increased autonomy in Tibet. It is conspicuous that India's policy of not embracing the cause of the Tibetan people in public is a manoeuvre to mitigate the concerns of China. However, China is vexed by the fact that India has provided asylum to the Dalai Lama, and is possibly supporting the autonomy of the Tibetan people, although cautiously.

# EVOLVING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS

The evolving regional and global political dynamics are a determining factor in the bilateral relations between India and China. The enduring rivalry between the two nuclear powers in South Asia, involvement of China in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry, and the geostrategic ambitions of superpowers have turned the region into a focal point. China allied itself with Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war and Sino-Soviet split. One of the cardinal reasons behind this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Co-Existence* (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967), 221-224.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> W.F. Van Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dipute with China* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 168-171.

was to counterbalance India and to maintain stability in South Asia. China intimidated India of opening a second front during the 1965 India-Pakistan war if it would not pull down the artillery in the disputed areas such as Tibet and Sikkim. Both Pakistan and China consider each other as dependable allies whenever India-Pakistan relations hit a low. Therefore, the cordial relationship between China and Pakistan, especially the arms nexus between both the states is a dire concern for New Delhi.

The rivalry for regional hegemony between India and China has been fierce in the post-Cold War era. The bilateral relationship between India and China also entails asymmetrical threat perception. India is relatively more apprehensive of the traditional security threats emanating from Beijing in the contemporary regional and global scenario while China is relatively self-assured regarding the threats from Delhi although it is aware of India's ties with Japan and ASEAN, especially in a scenario when China is embroiled in territorial disputes with some Southeast Asian states in the South China.

China has always maintained ties with other South Asian states such as Bangladesh and Nepal in an effort to counter India's pursuit of regional hegemony. Therefore, India and China are always entangled in regional competition which is aimed at countering the influence of the other.

#### THE PAKISTAN FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

India deems the strategic partnership between China and Pakistan as a collusion in which Islamabad acts as China's proxy to counterbalance India's role in the region. The China-Pakistan partnership has culminated into an "all-weather friendship" over the decades, although both the states have disparate socio-political systems. The fact that Pakistan was in the capitalist camp during the Cold War, as evident from its membership in SEATO and CENTO, did not curb both the states

from developing cordial ties. In comparison to the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations, both China and Pakistan have been successful in ensuring enduring politico-economic and geostrategic partnership.<sup>86</sup>

Beijing has been aware of the fact that regional conflicts are steaming up, especially the profound rivalry between India and Pakistan. China deems India-Pakistan rivalry as the major reason of hostility in South Asia and has sought the prudent management of the issue.<sup>87</sup> China no longer considers that relentless Indo-Pakistan rivalry is in its favour and hesitates to side with any state as it deems peaceful peripheral security environment conducive to domestic economic growth. China has always been reluctant to direct clear support to Pakistan and exhorts both the states to resolve disputes through amicable means. It has moved on from exploiting the rivalry between both the states to the point where it seeks to stabilize the regional environment.<sup>88</sup>

The first clear expression of China's policy in South Asia in the post-Cold War period is evident from the speech that China's President Jiang Zemin gave to the Senate of Pakistan during his visit in 1996. He proclaimed five principles for maintaining long-term and cordial relations with all South Asian states. He also asserted that conflicting states in the region must resolve their disputes through amicable means. Beijing has repeatedly asserted that its cordial relations with Pakistan are not directed towards any other state, especially India.

China's stance on the Kashmir dispute is the prime example of its position in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry. Beijing has avoided taking sides in the Kashmir dispute and has distanced itself from Islamabad's stance of holding a referendum. It has

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, *The Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the* 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000), 163-164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Ren Xin, "1996: A Year of Diplomatic Feats for China," *Beijing Review* (January 1997).

<sup>88</sup> Noorani, A.G., "On Sino-Indian Relations," Frontline (January 2002).

exhorted both the sides to resolve the dispute through a dialogue. Moreover, Beijing also fears that an independent state of Kashmir would instigate the separatist movements in its northwestern autonomous region of Xinjiang to seek independence with increased vigour.<sup>89</sup>

#### CHINA-PAKISTAN MILITARY TIES

Although, China and Pakistan maintain cordial relations in different fields, the military ties between both the states remain an important element in bilateral relations. 90 China has been a constant source of military equipment to Pakistan since 1962. It has assisted Pakistan with the production of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) such as Haider-I and Ghaznavi-I, and the production of mediumrange ballistic missiles (MRBMs) such as Ghauri and Shaheen. The former Defence Minister of India has vituperated China for being the mother of Ghauri. China and Pakistan have been cooperating in several projects to enhance Pakistan's military capabilities including the joint development of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircrafts. 91

India deems the military ties between China and Pakistan as one of the profound issues that remain unresolved in the Sino-Indian relations. India has repeatedly exhorted China to revise its policy of supporting Pakistan's nuclear and missile program if it wants India to support China's stance on Taiwan and Tibet issues. 92 India considers China-Pakistan military ties as a move to ensure Pakistan's strategic parity with India to counter India's increasing influence in South Asia. 93

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Rosemary Foot, "Chinese-Indian relations and the process of building confidence implications for the Asia-Pacific," The Pacific Review 9, no. I (1996).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Mary Lee, "Two-way street for arms: Pakistan buys from China but also sells what China cannot get," Far Eastern Economic Review (December 1985).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Mary Lee, "Two-way street for arms: Pakistan buys from China but also sells what China cannot get," Far Eastern Economic Review (December 1985).

92 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (New

Delhi: India Research Press, 2003).

<sup>93</sup> Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, "India and Pakistan at the Edge," Survival 44, no. 3 (2002).

During his visit to China in 2003, the former Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee argued, while raising the issue of military ties between China and Pakistan, that all the weaponry that Pakistan receives from China is aimed at India. However, Beijing has dismissed Indian claims by asserting that China's military ties with Pakistan are profit-oriented and are not directed against any state including India.

#### CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

India considers its relation with Pakistan as a zero-sum game. This serves as a basis for the fact that India resists any advantage to its arch rival. It may be noted that India's hostility towards CPEC is based on the fact that the economic corridor between China and Pakistan runs through Gilgit-Baltistan. India deems Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the so-called Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and hence, a disputed territory. Therefore, it has expressed political concerns in the international arena regarding the route of the corridor. 94 These concerns were addressed by Sukh Deo Muni, former India's special envoy to Southeast Asian countries on UNSC reforms, who stated that the project is being executed at the cost of India's interests. 95 Therefore, the Indian leaders have raised concerns against the project and the Prime Minister of India; Narendra Modi even exhorted the President of China Xi Jinping to halt the project. 96

It may also be noted that the Indian leaders consider the involvement of China in the corridor passing through the so-called Pakistan occupied Kashmir

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Siegfried O. Wolf, "The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An Assessment of its Feasibility and Impact on Regional Cooperation," Social Science Research Network. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2834599">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2834599</a> (2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Debasish Roy Chowdhury, "Pakistan happy to aid in China's quest for land route to the west; India, not so much," South China Morning Post. <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/commodities/article/1359761/pakistan-happy-aid-chinas-quest-land-route-west-india-not-so">https://www.scmp.com/business/commodities/article/1359761/pakistan-happy-aid-chinas-quest-land-route-west-india-not-so</a> (2009)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Massarat Abid and Ayesha Ashfaq, "CPEC: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan," *Pakistan Vision* 16, no. 2 (2015): 142-169.

(PoK) as China's approval of Pakistan's assertion regarding Kashmir. <sup>97</sup> According to the Indian leadership, this is akin to giving legitimacy to the Pakistan's political and administrative control of Kashmir. Another concern raised by the Indian government is that the many of the Chinese personnel working in Pakistan are part of the People's Liberation Army. India deems this presence of the Chinese military officials in Pakistan as a threat to its national security and regard it as the expansionist tendency on the part of China that can destabilize the region and can have disastrous consequences for the peace and stability in South Asia. <sup>98</sup>

However, in contrast to the Indian claims, China assert that its Belt and Road Initiative is not a strategic move by China to ensure its naval presence in the Indian Ocean as claimed by the so-called String of Pearls theory. China also asserts that the project is based on the idea of mutual cooperation and would benefit all the member countries by allowing them to share the economic growth of China.

#### CHINA'S EVALUATION OF THE 'LOOK EAST' POLICY

India's 'Look East' Policy can be deemed as a decision to counterbalance China's hegemonic tendencies, and signifies India's assertiveness in contrast to defensive attitude. It is aimed at strengthening ties with China's eastern neighbours with a view to put strain on China's security. <sup>99</sup> In the early 1990s, India took massive reforms to compensate for its mulish policy and inward looking economy. The then Prime Minister of India P.V. Narasimha Rao embraced the cardinal tenets

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Anilesh S. Mahajan, "Worrying Signals," <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/focus/">https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/focus//www.businessto

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, "The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor One Year On – Analysis," <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/16052016-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-one-year-on-analysis/">https://www.eurasiareview.com/16052016-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-one-year-on-analysis/</a> (2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Satu P. Limaye, "Message to India: Come back to Asia," *The Asian Wall Street Journal* (December 1993).

of economic liberalism and demonstrated the "Look East Policy" to reinvigorate India's ties with the East Asia, especially the member states of ASEAN.

China views this profound rapport between the Southeast Asian states and India as being motivated by the inclination towards maintaining the balance of power in the region. This assumption is substantiated by the fact that the Southeast Asian states did not criticized India's nuclear weapon test explosions in May 1998. China deems this moderate response on the part of ASEAN as recognizing India as an emerging regional power capable of maintaining parity with China.

Although China does not give much attention to the economic aspect of the ASEAN-India relations, it is cautious of the geo-strategic aspects of India's Look East Policy. The security and military relations of India with the Southeast Asian states has instigated mistrust in Sino-Indian relations. It has cautioned China of India's clandestine strategic ambitions. The policy makers in China contend that there are two major reasons behind India's Look East policy i.e. India's quest for greater role at the global level, and an effort to marginalize China in the region as evident from the former Indian President K.R. Narayanan's assertion following Pokhran-II that India would make profound efforts to Asian solidarity. <sup>100</sup> It may be noted that the reference towards Asian solidarity signifies strenuous efforts on the part of New Delhi to deepen its strategic ties with ASEAN. In other words, it is aimed at ensuring India's great power status. <sup>101</sup>

#### **EVOLVING INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS**

For China, another major concern regarding India's "Look East" policy is the evolving Indo-Japanese partnership. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Zhao Gancheng, "India's Look-East Policy: Development and Significance," *Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies*, no. 8 (2007): 13-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Liu Xiaojuan and Zhang Jian, "An Analysis of Non-Economic Factors of India's Look to the East Policy," *South Asian Studies Quarterly*, no. 4 (2006): 98-101.

visited Japan in November 2016 and signed several MOUs with his counterpart. The most important one included "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of Japan for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" which aimed at increased mutual cooperation in the field of nuclear power. Moreover, both the states released "India-Japan Vision Statement" on 29 October 2018 when the Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Japan. It recognized the immense potential for the strengthening of relations between both the states. It was agreed comprehensively develop Sino-Indian relations and reinforce the strategic ties between both the states.

The significance of the above is that, in the past, both India and Japan have fought wars with China and, currently, both India and Japan have territorial disputes with China. For both India and Japan, China remains an unarticulated threat. The Chinese side tends to conclude that the India-Japan partnership is built based on the strategic consideration of containing China. They argue that the impact of the Indo-Japanese partnership upon Asian politics deserve attention. It has also been pointed out that the Japanese media reported a suggestion by the former Taiwan President, Lee Teng-hui, that the Japanese should work together with Taiwan and India to contain China. From the Chinese perspective, all the signs indicate that India, with increasing military and economic might, has set its sights on the Asia-Pacific region.

# INDO-U.S. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A COUNTERBALANCE TO CHINA

It is conspicuous that the United States deemed India's cooperation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War as suspicious. The nonalignment policy of India was described as 'immoral' by the former Secretary of State of the United States John F. Dulles. Moreover, the United States' military ties with Islamabad and rapport with Beijing hindered any possibility of an affable India-United States

relationship. The conclusion of the bitter Cold War marked by the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the disintegration of USSR along with the economic liberal approach adopted by India in the early 1990s paved the path for increased India-United States cooperation. The upsurge of China is one of the cardinal reasons that influence U.S. policy towards India. After the demise of the USSR, China has been seen as a possible challenger to the US in the future, and the US has watched China's rise in international society and its military modernization with misgivings. It is thought that the US would like to contain China by establishing an anti-China alliance.

It is not new that the defence papers issued by India and the US have always described China as a rival. The United States is aware of New Delhi's security concerns regarding China. For instance, during a Congressional panel hearing, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, confirmed that "Pakistan is certainly a component in India's security considerations but not the only one, indeed, not the major one." After his "fact-finding" visit to India, US Senator Gary Ackerman concluded that there was a consensus in the mainstream Indian political leadership that China is its main adversary in the region.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The research posits that there exists disparity in relative threats perceptions between India and China as India seems to be profoundly apprehensive of the threats emanating from China, whereas China tends to be relatively unperturbed by the threats with regard to India, and finds it hard to comprehend why India deems China a threat. It proclaims the fact that a state with a higher degree of threat perception would bring about definite measures to alleviate the intensity of the threat. The research, thus, examines a plethora of outstanding issues in Sino-Indian relations, such as the border dispute, the Tibet issue, the proliferation of nuclear

weapons and regional competition to ascertain the disparate threats perception as a determinant of foreign policy.

The analysis of Sino-Indian relations signifies the role of soft balancing in alleviating threats perception. Nonetheless, hard balancing initiatives, such as development of nuclear weapons, tend to have profound impact on reducing the threat, the state with higher degree of threat perception is wary of taking hard balancing measures in an effort to tackle the threat as it assumes that blatantly withstanding the rival state is far more detrimental than favourable. It is evident from India's reluctance in playing the "Tibet card" against China at the international level, despite the fact that India is profoundly averse to China's absolute sovereignty over Tibet. New Delhi is also quite wary of exasperating Beijing by establishing the anti-China alliance.

The research also concludes that the disparity in relative threats perception is a destabilizing factor in bilateral relations as it mars every effort to restore the trust between both the states and instigate cooperation between them. The side with a higher degree of threat perception is aimed at changing the status quo in its favour in order to be more secure. As an implication, the other state becomes threatened and responds with every effort to nullify the counterbalancing initiatives by the rival state.

In addition to the aforementioned inferences, the study provides a historical analysis of the Sino-Indian relations to substantiate the fact that the longstanding animosity between both the states would not cease to exist abruptly. The sources of threat can be perceived as constant as long as the asymmetry is not rectified because the degree of animosity emanating from a particular historical event would remain constant over time. In case of Sino-Indian relations, the 1962 war is the major source of enmity for India and the degree of animosity derived from this event has not waned over time, nor has it amplified. Furthermore, as the source of threat

remains constant, any goodwill initiative would not alleviate the enmity. The repeated efforts to realize the true essence of the phrase "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai!" have failed over years in advancing the China-India relations.

# CONSOLIDATION OF MONOLITHIC STRUCTURE

# POST-STALINIST TRANSITION IN USSR

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#### **ABSTRACT**

This paper tries to bring into light the reasons of loss of dynamism in Post-Stalin period, which resulted into a systematic crisis. It is highlighted that how Khrushchev tried to make flexible centralized system but he failed and was ousted due to his policies by the fellow Politburo. In this paper, it is elaborated that after Khrushchev monolithic structure was headed by an oligarchic style of dictatorial setup. Brezhnev was more strict then Stalin in his centralized policies. By the state and up to the end of Brezhnev and then Andropov and Cherenkov all policies were carried out without disturbing the essence of a centralized state. This chapter studies the process and policies, which perpetuate the monolithic structure while society was changing organically on various grounds.

KEYWORDS; Socialism, Russia, USSR, Stalinism, State, Transition

#### POST WORLD WAR 2 ERA

It is difficult to demarcate that when the consolidation period of the monolithic state started. However, it could be identified with the end of World War-II, Soviet victories, and subsequent expansion into Eastern Europe. During the war, Stalin had gain enough popularity from the Soviet masses in favor of his static designs. World War-II had produced a popular ground of patriotism to legitimize the Stalinist model. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suffered enormous losses during world War-II but it had also gain tremendously and contributed towards the Soviet rise as a world power.

Joseph Stalin was desperate to get all the possible advantages by establishing Soviet satellite states in eastern central Europe, as no major power existed in postwar Europe, which could counter the soviet design in Eastern Europe. The extension of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into Eastern Europe and the creation of the Satellite system was a very well thought plan. The extension was very much owed to the power of the Red army and next to its skillful communist political strategies.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also established its influence by controlling the economies of these countries. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had consolidated its control over all these countries by inserting its version of financial policies and institutions. These policies were aimed at the industrialization of the Eastern European countries, the creation of the Soviet Eastern European economic block, and the coordination of satellite economies. Because of these developments, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics got of such a position from where it could dominate all the trading relationship of satellite and could restrict these trade and economics in the union's favor. Thus, these policies stabilized and consolidated the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' control over all these countries. Soviet method of gaining control over these countries varied because from Kremlin's point of view the East Europe was a picture of excessive diversity as almost every country wanted to have their own version of communism according to the national domestic perspective. However, all these countries were not in a position to implement their program.

All of them had to accept the massive support and domination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics except Yugoslavia where Marshall Tito<sup>103</sup> did not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Basil Dmitry, U.S.S.R: A Concise History (New York, 1990), 246, 248.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Joseph Broz Tito, original name Joseph Broz, (1892, 1980), Yugoslav revolutionary and political leader. Tito was the chief architect of the "second Yugoslavia," a socialist federation that lasted from World War II until 1991. He was the first Communist leader in power to defy Soviet

surrender like other people's democracies. <sup>104</sup>Kremlin's tactics of imposing political and economic structural order were the duplication of the same tactics and institutions, which he had established within the soviet mainland to consolidate his totalitarian despotic machinery. <sup>105</sup> Stalin insisted on uniformity in these people's democracies on the Kremlin's pattern. Moscow laid down the direct administrative control of their communist ruler in terms of emphasis on discipline, uniformity, Moscow's monopoly and drives towards collectivizing agriculture and centrally planned industrialization. Monolith Empire in peripheries resulted into another

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hegemony, a backer of independent roads to socialism (sometimes referred to as "national communism"), and a promoter of the policy of nonalignment between the two hostile blocs in the Cold War. Josip Broz was born to a large peasant family in Kumrovec, northwest of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, of a Croat father and a Slovene mother. He was apprenticed to a locksmith in 1907 and completed his training in 1910, when he joined the Social Democratic Party of Croatia-Slavonia at Zagreb. After working as an itinerant metalworker in various Austro-Hungarian and German centers, he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army in 1913, completed noncommissioned-officer training, and was sent as a sergeant in the war against Serbia in 1914. Transferred to the Russian front in early 1915, he was seriously wounded and captured by the Russians in April 1915. After a long hospitalization, he was sent to prisoner-of-war camps, where he became acquainted with Bolshevik propaganda. In 1917 he participated in the July Days demonstrations in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and, after the October Revolution, joined a Red Guard unit in Omsk, Siberia. Following a White counteroffensive, he fled to Kirgiziya (now Kyrgyzstan) and subsequently returned to Omsk, where he married a Russian woman and joined the South Slav section of the Bolshevik party. In October 1920 he returned to his native Croatia (then part of the newly established Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) and soon joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Stalin's departure lessened the pressures for greater integration with the West, and Tito came to conceive of his internal and foreign policy as being equidistant from both blocs. Seeking like-minded political leaders elsewhere, he found them in the leaders of the developing countries. Negotiations with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India in June 1956 led to a closer cooperation among states that were "nonengaged" in the East-West confrontation. From no engagement evolved the concept of "active nonalignment"—that is, the promotion of alternatives to bloc politics, as opposed to mere neutrality. The first meeting of nonaligned states took place in Belgrade under Tito's sponsorship in 1961. The movement continued thereafter, but by the end of his life Tito had been eclipsed by new member states, such as Cuba, that conceived of nonalignment as anti-Westernism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Yugoslavia was an exemption because Marshall Tito did not believe on the Stalin's interpretation of communist union. Tito claimed for himself for correct interpretation of Marxism and accused Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of chauvinistic imperialism in its foreign affairs dealing. Tito rejected bureaucratic despotism of soviet leadership in Yugoslavia's domestic affairs and did not let the soviet do the soviet experiment of monolithic in his homeland.

Joseph Rothscild, Return To Diversity (London, 1992).26

phase of purge. This time these purges were carried out to purify the communist parties of satellite states so that no party could dare to follow the Yugoslavian example of adoption separate lines from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In order to prevent another defiance of Tito's type Stalin purged other potential eastern European socialist state by political constrictions in every state. A network of soviet troops, diplomats, secret police agents and bilateral trade treaties, which enabled U.S.S.R to exploit the peripheral states economically, ensured a monolithic set up. Thus, Stalin successfully implanted a monolithic eastern European block. <sup>106</sup>Soviet political administrative and cultural monolithic institution set up supervised by soviet authorities characterized this monolithic block. During war, patriotic enthusiasm had replaced to some extent the ingredient of static authoritarianism. At the end of the war, soviet masses were in hope for liberalization. However, it was not about to happen. Instead, Stalin restored prewar state policies of tight totalitarianism. <sup>107</sup> He resumed rapid industrialization to cope with the postwar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> David Mackenzie, *History of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (California, 1991) .345

<sup>107</sup> Totalitarianism is a political system that prohibits opposition parties, restricts individual opposition to the state and its claims, and exercises an extremely high degree of control over public and private life. It is regarded as extreme and complete form of authoritarianism. Political power in totalitarian states has often been held by autocrats, which employ all-encompassing propaganda campaigns broadcast by state-controlled mass media. Totalitarian regimes are often characterized by extensive political repression, use of political violence, opposition to democracy, widespread personality cultism, and absolute control over the economy, restriction of speech, mass surveillance. and widespread use of state terrorism. Other aspects of a totalitarian regime includes the inclusion of concentration camps, secret police, religious persecution or state atheism, extensive use of capital punishment and potentially state-sponsored mass murders and genocides. Historian Robert Conquest describes a totalitarian state as one recognizing no limits to its authority in any sphere of public or private life and which extends that authority to whatever length feasible. The concept was first developed in the 1920s by both Weimar jurist (and later Nazi academic) Carl Schmitt and, concurrently, the Italian fascists. Italian fascist Benito Mussolini said "Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state". Schmitt used the term Totalstaat in his influential 1927 work on the legal basis of an all-powerful state,. The term gained prominence in Western anti-communist political discourse during the Cold War era as a tool to convert pre-war anti-fascism into postwar anti-communism. Totalitarian regimes are different from other authoritarian regimes. The latter denotes a state in which the single power holder—an individual "dictator", a committee, a junta, or an otherwise small group of political elite-monopolizes political power. "Authoritarian state is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty." Authoritarianism "does not attempt to change

situation. Stalin reordered the prewar despotic policies with more restricted promulgation. During the war, central supervision over the collective farming had been relaxed to some extent and was given some autonomy. However, very after the end of the war all these concessions and autonomy were withdrawn and central interference was reinforced more authoritatively.

#### KHRUSHCHEV AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MONOLITH

Joseph Stalin had not left any constitutional criteria according to which any member of the Politburo might succeed Stalin with the same powers enjoyed by Stalin so that the superstructure of the soviet monolith be sustained. The monolithic set up was established by Stalin, which was characterized by its dynamism for its functioning for many years. Until Stalin's death, this structure was stable due to his single-headed totalitarian policies but very after his death in the lack of any succession criteria there emerge a threat of withering of this monolith structure. This setup was initially replaced by the collective Leadership of Georgi Malenkov, 109 Lavrenti Beria, and V. M. Molotov. However, this setup

the world and human nature". In contrast, a totalitarian regime attempts to control virtually all aspects of the social life, including the economy, education, art, science, private life and morals of citizens. Some totalitarian governments may promote an elabourate ideology: "The officially proclaimed ideology penetrates into the deepest reaches of societal structure and the totalitarian government seeks to completely control the thoughts and actions of its citizens". It also mobilizes the whole population in pursuit of its goals. Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "A Totalist Ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Michal Reiman, *The Birth of Stalinism* (London, 179) .20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov (1902 – 1988) was a Soviet politician who briefly succeeded Joseph Stalin as the leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, at the insistence of the rest of the Presidium, he relinquished control over the party in exchange for remaining first among equals as the country's Premier. Subsequently, Malenkov became embroiled in a power struggle ultimately culminating in his removal from the premiership in 1955 and the Presidium in 1957. Throughout his political career, Georgy Malenkov's personal connections with Vladimir Lenin significantly facilitated his ascent within the ruling Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. By 1925, he was entrusted with overseeing the party's records. This brought him into contact with Stalin who had by then successfully consolidated power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to become the de facto leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Because of this association, Malenkov became heavily

could not accommodate and in this situation, Khrushchev<sup>110</sup> emerged on the stage and like Stalin consolidated his authority behind the stage. Like Stalin, he consolidated his position with the support of party and like Stalin he felt that party was hurdle in his autocratic functioning. Then he turned his attention to replace the unreliable party members. However, Khrushevev did not use the police or tyrant method to accomplish these objectives. Next to the consolidation, Khrushchev focused his attention on agriculture and the economy, which was going through critical situations. Khrushchev blamed the disorganization of the agricultural farms

involved in Stalin's purges before later being given sole responsibility over the Soviet missile program during World War II. From 1946 to 1947, he chaired the Council of Ministers Special Committee on Rocket Technology. In order to secure his position as Stalin's favorite, he successfully discredited Marshal Georgy Zhukov and suppressed all glory associated with Leningrad during World War II so that Moscow maintained its image as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' sole cultural and political capital. Following Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, Malenkov temporarily emerged as the Soviet leader's undisputed successor by replacing him as both Chairman of the Council of Ministers (or Premier) and the highest-ranking member of the party's Secretariat. However, only nine days later, the Politburo (then known as the Presidium) forced him to give up his position in the Secretariat while allowing him to retain the premiership. Henceforth, Malenkov presided over a collective leadership until being removed as Premier in 1955 by the party's First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. After later organizing a failed coup against Khrushchev in 1957, he was expelled from the Presidium and exiled to Kazakhstan in 1957, before ultimately being expelled from the Party altogether in November 1961. He officially retired from politics shortly afterwards. After a short sojourn in Kazakhstan, he returned to Moscow and kept a low profile for the remainder of his life.

<sup>110</sup> Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) led the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the height of the Cold War, serving as premier from 1958 to 1964. Though he largely pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, the Cuban Missile Crisis began after he positioned nuclear weapons 90 miles from Florida. At home, he initiated a process of "de-Stalinization" that made Soviet society less repressive. Yet Khrushchev could be authoritarian in his own right, crushing a revolt in Hungary and approving the construction of the Berlin Wall. Known for his colorful speeches, he once took off and brandished his shoe at the United Nations. At first, Khrushchev and other high-ranking officials ruled through a form of collective leadership. But in 1955 he organized the ouster of Premier Georgi Malenkov and replaced him with an ally, Nikolai Bulganin. Khrushchev foiled a Malenkov-led coup attempt in June 1957 and took over the premiership the following March. Once a loyal Stalinist, Khrushchev gave a long speech in February 1956 that criticized Stalin for arresting and deporting opponents, for elevating himself above the party and for incompetent wartime leadership, among other things. This withering, albeit incomplete, indictment of Stalin was supposed to remain secret. By that June, however, the U.S. State Department had published the complete text. Starting in 1957, Khrushchev made some minor attempts to rehabilitate Stalin's image. But he switched course once again in 1961, when the city of Stalingrad was renamed and Stalin's remains were removed from Lenin's mausoleum in Moscow's Red Square.

and criticized the obsolete structure of the agricultural administration. <sup>111</sup> He launched a full-fledged reform scheme in the agriculture section and industrial sector. He wanted to break the grip of autocratic functioning regarding agriculture and industry, which were not giving results. Under the newly introduced program, industrial and agricultural enterprises were to place under regional economic councils. He wanted to undermine the centralized planning system. However, his policies result in a complicated Set up of decision-making as various authorities still lie with the center. His process of decentralizing could not succeed.

Deficiencies of his reforms became apparent and change his mind to retreat from these policies. The process of centralization was first relaxed and then re-imposed these processes of the reorganization of industrial and agricultural sectors caused various dysfunctions and complicated production processors. The main reason behind these failures was that Khrusheve inherited a generation and system in which change could only be brought from above. 112 Khrushchev started his polices with the desperation that these polices could bear fruit but in the end, he had to readopt or restore the Stalinists methods of executing policies and planning. Due to the relaxations are given by Khrushchev uprising in several satellite countries started to gain momentum in Bulgaria, East Germany Czechoslovakia Poland, and Romania, workers and students uprisings were started to gain domestic freedom. All these upheavals were aimed at getting monetary reform and incentive regarding domestic issues. Not almost all these moments desired for any kind of systematic or ideological confrontation with soviet structural system. 113 While Khrusheve's policies were not absolutist as compared with Stalinist policies but Khrushchev too would not tolerate any gesture, which could decompose communist hegemony over these satellite countries. Khrushchev had to face all such challenges with methods

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Basil Dmytry, U.S.S.R: A Concise History (New York, 1990), 283.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Alec Nove, An Economic History of U.S.S.R (London, 1984), 369.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Joseph Rothscild, Return to Diversity (London, 1992), 160.

that were harsher than Stalin executed in his era. The rational of all such repressive policies was the threat of rebellion in Soviet satellite countries as these uprising could become the catalyst for total transformation from domestic freedom to the supposed to end of soviet monolithic hegemony.<sup>114</sup>

Era of Khrushchev was characterized by the restrained separation of the political system and economic and agriculture functions. He promulgated his de-centralized policies for the well functioning of wartime agricultural and industrial sectors so that he could consolidate the empire but his policies could not be adjusted to reconcile his designs. Therefore, towards the end of this period, he restored the traditional methods of Stalin. However, within months he concentrated all powers in his person. In his era politburo became the policymaker and executing authority in Union. This executive organ was led and controlled by the first secretary. All the final decisions were confined to the Politburo and within the Politburo; all powers were confined to the first secretary with less reliance on his fellow members of the Politburo. In the Stalin period, this executive body (Politburo) hardly functioned because Stalin retained absolutist powers of decisionmaking in himself. However, during Khrushchev, these absolutist powers were started to incorporate the higher member of Politburo though very narrowly. This incorporation was confined to those members whom first secretary hoped to support him. 115 Khrushchev had proceeded his period with ideological experimentation based on de-organization of centralizes structure and followed by deficiencies of this de organizational change he ended his period with re organization on Stalin lines. This experimentation was considered as a threat that could undermine the disciplined and ideological parameters that soviet monolith was required at that time. Most particularly politburo had strong reservations regarding his policies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup>Ted Grant, Russia: From Revolution To Counter Revolution (Lahore, 1999), 365.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup>Marry Macaulay, Politics and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (New York, 1982), 191.

pertained to self-administration in local and indigenous level of state. Khrushchev's ouster showed that once the institution of terror was abolished he should use the consensus of his fellows as substitute for the stability of his position. <sup>116</sup>

#### BREZHNEV AND HIS STRICT POLICIES

Once again, a 'collective leadership' assumed control with the approval of politburo headed by leonied. I. Brezhnev. 117 Brezhnev gradually concentrated all powers and had modified one-man autocrat rule over U.S.S.R very after getting consolidated his position he started to draw his policies which were based on the old Stalinistic method by abandoning Khrushchev's policies of relaxation. Brezhnev rule was an era of oligarchy. With the help of his oligarchic rule, he tightened control over dissidents and intellectuals and then he combined agricultural sector and industrial sector with the help of coercive and dreadful method. Through this process, he increased the managerial powers of soviet officials, which were curtailed by Khrushchev.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Seweryn Bialer, *The Soviet Paradox* (New York, 1989), 420.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Leonid Brezhnev, (1906-1982), was a Soviet political leader and Communist Party official who was the leader of the Soviet Union for 18 years. After his death, he was criticized for a gradual slide in living standards, the spread of corruption and cronyism within the Soviet bureaucracy, and the generally stagnant and dispiriting character of Soviet life in the late 1970s and early '80s.

Oligarchy is a form of power structure in which power rests with a small number of people. These people may be distinguished by nobility, wealth, education or corporate, religious, political, or military control. Such states are often controlled by families who typically pass their influence from one generation to the next, but inheritance is not a necessary condition for the application of this term. Throughout history, oligarchies have often been tyrannical, relying on public obedience or oppression to exist. Aristotle pioneered the use of the term as meaning rule by the rich, for which another term commonly used today is plutocracy. In the early 20th century, Robert Michels developed the theory that democracies, as all large organizations, have a tendency to turn into oligarchies. In his "Iron law of oligarchy", he suggests that the necessary division of labour in large organizations leads to the establishment of a ruling class mostly concerned with protecting their own power. This was already recognized by the Athenians in the fourth century BCE: after the restoration of democracy from oligarchical coups, they used the drawing of lots for selecting government officers to counteract that tendency toward oligarchy in government. They drew lots from large groups of adult volunteers to pick civil servants performing judicial, executive, and administrative functions. They even used lots for posts, such as judges and jurors in the political courts which had the power to overrule the Assembly

During Brezhnev rule, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had to face declining economic growth in both industrial and agricultural sector and increasing demands of soviet resources. Official reformers were of the view that central planning must be curtailed and introduced the competitive condition by urging the individual plans. But party apparatus and politburo rejected such proposals by considering this as an attempt to undermine the super centralized structure. So they refused to dismantle the central planning mechanism and centrally controlled managerial powers. Brezhnev refused to relax control and move towards marketoriented socialism. Under his guidelines a new policy was launched which was based on new system of planning and incentives. These policies introduced reforms, which included managerial economics and profit ideas with strong central economics ministries. In this way, technocrats of politburo authoritative position and authorities, which were conducted in Stalin's era. Their reformatted policies applied all over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These policies increased the authorities of centrally appointed officials and reduced the managerial powers of local officials. Brezhnev dismantled some of the objectionable features of Khrushchev and modified some of his center-oriented policies. In order to cope with economic problems, Brezhnev adopted 'Duel Approach Policy.' He continued some policies of Khrushchev with some fundamental changes. He brought a change in Khrushchev's policies by implanting them with many of Stalin's tactics and policies. Brezhnev's era produced no one spectacular impact either on the domestic front of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or on international relations of the U.S.S.R. His era was free of any major crisis and an almost stable domestic front. The major characteristic of this era manifested the perpetuation of Stalinist and Khrushchev s legacy of the Monolith Empire. It was an era of Brezhnetive version of soviet monolithic. Whatever he did was merely a continuation of Stalin and Khrushchev to construct, consolidate and safe guard the empire. Another significant characteristic of his policy of curbing hostility towards the consolidation of soviet monopoly over union was manifest in his harsh measure regarding dissent voices and nationalist demand.

One of the most significant features of Brezhnev era was the increasing demands of Russian and non-Russians for individual freedom, democratic autonomy and social justice. This phenomenon of dissent was born in the era of Khrushchev due to his relaxation policies. Considering these trends a threat to the soviet empire Brezhnev administration dealt all these dissents very harshly. During his regime nationalism raised head in various parts of U.S.S.R most particularly in peripheral eastern Europe regions of Lithuania, Caucasus, Central Asia and Non Slavic elements were started to raised their demand of domestic autonomy and were seeking genuine soviet federalism and autonomy accordingly to the constitutional prerogative. The problem of new emerging nationalism varied from region to region and spoke for the broader political autonomy. They tried to promote local or indigenous cultural traits. In order to achieve identity these nationalist movement resisted all Russian efforts to reinforce Russian linguistic and monoculture assimilation, these projects represented central Russian efforts to implant a mono culture all over federation by surpassing every sort of pluralism. The uniformed cultural and linguist projects were resisted by union thus they gained enough momentum by reasoning non-Russian nationalism. Under the guise of communism, Russian culture was imposing on all non-Russian satellite and so called confederated countries. Religious dissent attracted the Frustrated and disillusioned youth who were seeking truth, justice civil rights and moral values which soviet government failed to provide them. Brezhnev administration dealt all these dissent voices and concern brutally. Moscow officials received the demands and concern of non-Russian nationalist as very dangerous and subordinator they considered all these dissent ass threat other solidarity of Kremlin monolith control. Brezhnev regime reacted harshly to all these voices, branded them bourgeois nationalist s,

and executed harsh and tough measures to eradicate them. Brezhnev followed the old Stalinist method to eradicate them and that was another phase of purge. Major purges took place in all the satellite states of Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia Latvia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Subsequent trials and draconian oppression were proceeded to diminish every major uprising witch could repudiate the Kremlin's centralized set up.

Prague Spring was the most important and significant episode of Brezhnev era, which further manifested his commitment to the consolidation of centrally controlled imperialistic outreach of U.S.S.R.<sup>119</sup> In 1953, Khrushchev had to face the almost same situation of revolt in case of Hungary uprising which he suppressed brutality. Brezhnev had to suppress the revolt of Czechoslovakia far more brutal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> The Prague Spring of 1968. As the new first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Dubcek was propelled into the role of chief reformer, even though he was not particularly qualified for it. He was a young Slovak who had spent his political life in the party apparatus, and, because he was a compromised candidate, people did not expect much from him. Yet in the effort of ridding the government of the old guard, Dubček was aided by the pressure of public opinion, which was growing stronger, especially after members of the press became determined to express themselves more freely in early March 1968. The crown achievement of the new reformist government was the Action Program, adopted by the party's Central Committee in April 1968. The program embodied reform ideas of the several preceding years; it encompassed not only economic reforms but also the democratization of Czechoslovak political life. Among its most important points were the promotion of Slovakia to full parity within a new Czechoslovak federation, long overdue industrial and agricultural reforms, a revised constitution that would guarantee civil rights and liberties, and complete rehabilitation of all citizens whose rights had been infringed in the past. The effect of the liberalization movement—which became known as the Prague Spring—on the Czechoslovak public was unprecedented and quite unexpected. There were efforts to reestablish the Social Democratic Party, forcibly fused with the Communist Party in 1948. With the collapse of the official communist youth movement, youth clubs and the Boy Scouts were resurrected. Christian churches, national minority associations, human rights groups, and other long-forgotten societies became active as well. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact allies were far more alarmed. After Dubcek declined to participate in a special meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers, they sent him a letter on July 15 saying that his country was on the verge of counterrevolution and that they considered it their duty to protect it. Nevertheless, Dubcek remained confident that he could talk himself out of any difficulties with his fellow communist leaders. He accepted an invitation by Brezhnev to a conference. On August 3, representatives of the Soviet, East German, Polish, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak Communist parties met again at Bratislava; the communiqué issued after that meeting gave the impression that pressure would be eased on Czechoslovakia in return for somewhat tighter control over the press.

than Khrushchev did. Although both revolts were different due to difference in their framework, however both had many similarities. Both uprising were result of saturated sentiments about domestic issue. Both were aimed at regional autonomy and enough freedom to promulgate their domestic version of socialism free of soviet monolithic domination. Both revolts sought to introduce the balanced and a humane element into the communist way of affairs. Final and most important similarity was that both were suppressed by soviet through heavy militant means. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia came on 1968. Soviet forces crushed the insurgent and occupied the entire country.

Czech masses were untied for the social justice and domestic autonomy. They did not desire for complete secession from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nevertheless, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics conceived an impression that Czechoslovakia was falling in to the hand of those who wanted to exclude it from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To Union of Soviet Socialist Republics administration this event could become explosion for the full scale launching of pluralism which could ultimately become threat towards the solidarity of monolithic control of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over not only peripheral regions of non-Russian but with the main land Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Czechoslovakia's traditional tendencies towards democratic socialism were considered by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics such tendency, which could transcend the pluralism in other countries. Which could, undermined the sovereignty of soviet monolithic. Therefore, it was the democratic character and content of the Czheckolovakia experiment, which emphasized a powerful reactionary moment that sought to overturn socialist system. That was why Moscow claimed justification for the right to intervene anywhere to prevent any opposition to their socialist set up. All this precipitated to ultimate invasion to perpetuate the superstructure of the Kremlin.

Another great threat to the soviet bloc developed and came into the front in Poland. In the decade 80s Poland was facing severe recession. All programs to bring reform were failed and workers started to format-independent trade union movement. It was known as solidarity movement, another big blow to soviet authoritarian system. In this polish episode, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confronted an acute policy dilemma of what the method must be adopted to cope with situation. This moment could trigger a series of discontent and dissent in the completely soviet block and thus put the solidarity of the soviet empire in the threat of withering away. Solidarity moment sought not only free trade union but also the institution of free election, independent court, and the abolishment of police authority. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could not tolerate this radical movement. Instead of opting for a military option because it could result in to harsh fire back, Brezhnev decided to opt very politically by using the option of military political intervention. Kremlin instigated the polish army to capture the regime of local government by proclaiming marshal law. This military government disbanded solidarity moment. However, this was all about status quo so that enough time could be gain to reconcile these insurgencies in long terms perspective.

Brezhnev administration was not satisfied with curbing of uprisings and dissent voices. This dissatisfaction had produced a dire need for some constitutional arrangements so that a so-called patch up could intend to redefine the state-masses relationship and state peripheries mechanism could be redraw. All this was aim to consolidate the empire. This constitution of 1977 was aimed at apparently on individual liberty and reinvigorating the cordial relationship among satellites and peripheries. The preamble of the constitution emphasizes on continuity stability of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. According to the constitution, soviet regime enjoys an absolute monopoly over all origins and sphere of powers.

All the prerogative of the constitution regarding individual rights and satellite reformation were remained unworthy because Kremlin still was holding of almost all the supreme powers of decision making regarding every sphere of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This drafting of the new constitution was mere a misnomer about so-called liberalism. It solidified the existing static set up with special reference to state and society. Brezhnev Era wars a mere continuation of traditional policies that were based on the establishment and consolidation of the Monolithic structure of state and Brezhnev dealt with all these concerning issues continuously and never realized any option to reconcile these issue by any other moderate means and solution.

## SUCCESSORS OF BREZHNEV

The last three or four years of Brezhnev are characterized by constant stagnation in almost all sectors of the static premise. The agricultural and economic sectors became stagnant. The Decision-making process became the victim of paralysis. <sup>120</sup> It seems all the state apparatus of the falling Brezhnev era become paralysis. With the Andropov<sup>121</sup> step in the office, it was assumed that Andropov must cope with the dire need of overhauling the whole system and must bring

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Ibid.,88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Yuri Andropov (1914–1984) was the sixth leader of the Soviet Union and the fourth General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Following the 18-year rule of Leonid Brezhnev, Andropov served in the post from November 1982 until his death in February 1984. Earlier in his career, Andropov served as the Soviet ambassador to Hungary from 1954 to 1957, during which time he was involved in the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. He was named Chairman of the KGB on 10 May 1967. In this position, he oversaw a massive crackdown on dissent carried out via mass arrests and the involuntary psychiatric commitment of people deemed "socially undesirable". Upon Brezhnev's death, Yuri Andropov succeeded him as General Secretary and leader of the Soviet Union. During his short tenure, Andropov sought to eliminate corruption and inefficiency within the Soviet system by investigating longtime officials for violations of party discipline and criminalizing truancy in the workplace. The Cold War intensified, and he was at a loss for how to handle the growing crisis in the Soviet economy. His major longterm impact was bringing to the fore a new generation of young reformers, as energetic as himself, including Yegor Ligachyov, Nikolai Ryzhkov, and, most importantly, Mikhail Gorbachev. However, upon suffering kidney failure in February 1983, Andropov's health began to deteriorate rapidly.

radical reform packages to get efficiency most particularly in a financially disrupted society. He did whatever he could do but whatever he did was based on the slow pace reform. He did not try to challenge the status quo by introducing radical progress to halt the multi-faceted corruption and disruption in state and society. Every reform package, which he innovated, was based on the pro-centralized conception of dealing issues up to the end of the Brezhnev era bureaucratic policymaking process become extremely institutionalize and due to this hyperactive institutionalized character of decision making Andropov could not afford to escape this mechanism while doing reforms. So whatever he did was confined to this institutional premise. Although, very after his succession he consolidated his authoritative rule by appointing his close associate at an important party position this was the apparatus through which Andropov had to work according to the determined requisites and that was just to follow the precedent. So because of this Andropov found it difficult to concentrate enough power to promulgate political changes on radical lines due to the state apparatus, he was confined to make a program with precedent features of enforcement and coercive measures.

Not all these policies ware based on drastic reform of economic agricultural sectors but he attempted for improvement in management and to bring efficiency in workers' occupations. He stressed on work discipline, strict observance of the planning policies, and emphasize on the reduction of absenteeism among functionaries and workers to solve the problem of inappropriate working conditions, he launched a program, which was operated at several levels. Through this program, he started a process of dismissal and imprisoning of the corrupt official so that the governmental function could be reinvigorated and re-activated. He ordered police forces all over the country to establish a checking process over workers. This destabilized era of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not free of curbing of dissent voices. Either these dissent uprisings were against the soviet regime or just aimed at immediate reforms, they had to become the victim of

brutal suppression through formal official warnings, harassment, imprisonment and expulsion from U.S.S.R. Some of the measures to curb these dissents was carried out through legally constituted style and some were carried out through secret police. Andropov's era was characterized by the tightening of political and ideological control. All his policies of consolidating the central structure of state. On the other side, he also tried to re-assess the role of central planning by including the segment of liberalism and restrained de-centralization in local industry but all his little bit liberalism was rolled back by Cherenkov who was for strict in his policies to solidify the failing and falling monolith super-structure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>122</sup>

As it is a widely accepted political notion that the crumbling empire becomes more authoritarian to stop its decline. So this was manifested in the mideighties of the U.S.S.R particularly in Konstantin Cherenkov's era. He was a stern conservative and found an empire that was in fact in dire need of comprehensive overhauling but the ruling elite was not ready to let it happen. The consolidation period of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics characterized by the intent to get success in the socialist program. On the other hand, it was also aimed at the empowerment of the ruling elite. A close study of the background and historical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup>Konstantin Chernenko (1911 –1985) was a Soviet politician and the fifth General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He briefly led the Soviet Union from 13 February 1984 until his death on 10 March 1985. Born to a poor family from Siberia, Chernenko joined the Komsomol (the Communist Party's youth league) in 1929 and became a full member of the party in 1931. After holding a series of propaganda posts, in 1948 he became the head of the propaganda department in Moldavia, serving under Leonid Brezhnev. After Brezhnev took over as First Secretary of the CPSU in 1964, Chernenko rose to head the General Department of the Central Committee, responsible for setting the agenda for the Politburo and drafting Central Committee decrees. In 1971, Chernenko became a full member of the Central Committee, and in 1978 he was made a full member of the Politburo. After the death of Brezhnev and his successor Yuri Andropov, Chernenko was elected General Secretary in February 1984 and made Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in April 1984. Due to his rapidly failing health, he was often unable to fulfill his official duties. He died in March 1985 after leading the country for only a year and a month, and was succeeded as General Secretary by Mikhail Gorbachev.

requisites proved that it was initially a program started by Stalin but very after his death, ruling elite emerged with designs primarily about their consolidation and safeguarding and very secondarily anything else. Careerists and politburo members had been converted into the new ruling class. Stalin was required of a particular and loyalist apparatus to operationalize his authoritarian policies. Stalinist construction of monolith structure was the requirement of a systematic response to emerging challenges. Soon after his death this situation of uncertainties was no longer exist. Therefore, this authoritarian system was of no use but this structure became self-dynamic and converted into an oligarchic version of authoritarianism from Stalin's sole control. So the post-Stalin era was the Stalinist era without Stalin and continuously characterized by perpetuation, consolidation, and safeguarding of this monolith setup.

This controlling class comprised various hierarchical strata, in first-line, these were soviet official spread all over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the second layer comprised on Russian over non-Russian in third line urban Russian over the rural-Russian and the fourth and most important class of this hierarchy rested in kremlin. Centralization of power in the premise of this kremlin body was one of the main factors causing the confinement of this ruling class in the shadow of monolith formation of static set up. 123 The post-Stalinist period of stability showed a complicated and contradictory set of policies. e.g. Khrushchev policies about agriculture were based on restrained de-centralization, but his policies about the industrial sector were contrary and messy his political approach was also characterized by contradiction. Various methods of coercion were abolished and terrorist elements were contained but the supremacy of super centralized state with its confined bureaucratic apparatus grew stronger so that was why monolithic despotism reached its apogee in a post-Stalin period very

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> Moshe Lewin, Russia U.S.S.R. Russia (New York, 1995), 27.

particularly in the ending period of Brezhnev in the late 70s. Brezhnev's period was initially aimed at to dump the critique on Stalin and his institutional polices. He also attempted successfully to solidify and re-invigorating the traditional Stalinist version of the static setup. However, he replaced the cult of Stalin's personality with the corporate style party of the bureaucratic elite. It was a faceless Stalin period. 124

Reforming the policies of Brezhnev and his successor was based on the objective of maintaining the central structure. Such policies would ultimately result in neither reform nor smashing of the status quo and caused by stagnation in all spheres of state and society. Thus, these features of consolidating the system laid down foundations of collapse. Brezhnev's stable government had produced a proliferation of corruption. Despite awareness, Brezhnev did not consider it seriously as it was aforementioned to him the possible outcome of the dismantlement of the empire. Politburo did not want to let loose the grip of monolith control whatever their policies were in the name of so-called reforms, bound to proceed without disturbing the centralized super structure whatever reforms they introduced had to function within the premise of centralized structure. By the ending phase of consolidation, slowing down of the economy with stagnant state function and paralyzes process of decision-making was in the initial process. Brezhnev recognized this and attempted to solve the problems rather than completely over haul the system. 125 All his efforts met with failures. If Brezhnev would have tried to completely overhaul the system, ruling elite could have defeated Brezhnev's efforts. Brezhnev ended with genesis of potentially produced crisis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> Seweryn Bialer, *The Soviet Paradox* (New York, 1989), 12.13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> Ibid., 23.

# **BOOK REVIEWS**

Book	Oceanic Islam: Muslim Universalism And European
	Imperialism
Author	Sugata Bose (Volume Editor), Ayesha Jalal (Volume
	Editor
Language	English
ISBN	9789389714289
Year of Publication	2020
Pages	280
Publisher	Bloomsbury Publishers
Reviewed by	Muhammad Ahmad

Oceanic Islam: Muslim Universalism and European Imperialism by Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (Volume Editors) is a new addition in the vast scholarship of Islamic histories. The Indian Ocean is an interregional arena with a space of dynamic economic and strategic position. This dynamic regional connectivity is remarkably categorized by focused flows of capitallabour, skills, services, ideas and culture. Islam in particular and religiously informed universalism in general once signified cosmopolitanism across this wide realm. This historical reality is at variance with contemporary conceptions of Islam as an illiberal religion that breeds intolerance and terrorism. The future balance of global power will be determined in large measure by policies of key actors in the Indian Ocean and the lands that abut it rather than in the Atlantic or the Pacific. The interplay of multiple and competing universalisms in the Indian Ocean arena is in urgent need of better understanding.

Oceanic Islam: Muslim Universalism and European Imperialism; is a fresh contribution to Islamic and Indian Ocean studies alike, placing the history of modern South Asia in broader interregional and global contexts. It refines theories of universalism and cosmopolitanism while at the same time drawing on new empirical research. The essays in the volume are comprised of the finest academic scholarship on south Asian Islam and across the Indian Ocean.

The influence of oceans on human history and civilization is brought by Ferdinand Braudal in his path-breaking work named, "The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II," He was a French historian from the Annales School. His book, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, was his most influential and watershed book. For Braudel Life on the plains is diverse and complex both cultural and economic. According to him, the Mediterranean cannot be understood independently from what is external and peripheral to it. The first level of time, geographical time, is that of the environment, with its slow change and its cyclical progression. The second level of time comprises long-term social, economic, and cultural history. The third level of time treats of "events, politics and people."

In this book, Fernand Braudel studied all avenues of human civilizations, which were not considered as single monolithic civilizations but part of different European civilizations. Ferdinand Braudal presented a new study tracing the connections between Europe and the Mediterranean. In his study, he presented series of north-south routes, natural isthmuses that are still decisive influences on modern history of the Europe. Taking the same trajectory of scholarship mastered by Braudal, South Asian historians also tried to explore the oceanic histories of Islam in south Asia. In this work, authors has explored the ties between the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean in the early modern and modern periods.

First chapter, 'Muslim Universalist Aspirations: Intimacies between the

Indus-Gangetic Plain and the Indian Ocean' by Ayesha Jalal is about the Intimacies between the Indus-Gangetic Plain and the Indian Ocean. Muslim imaginings were animated by a sense of belonging to a worldwide community of believers long before colonial empires heralded the age of steam and print. Aural, textual, and visual expressions of Islamic Universalist aspirations are imaginatively interwoven in the literature, music, arts, and architecture of the Muslim world abutting the Indian Ocean. The increased volume of travel and exchange, which came with the ease of modern travel, alone, cannot explain the enduring vitality of the period from the mid-nineteenth century to the first three decades of the twentieth for an understanding of Muslim conceptions of Islamic universalism. With the Western colonial powers controlling the flow of haj pilgrims, Indian Muslim feelings of disempowerment and subjugation to Western colonial domination led to greater empathy with co-religionists in other parts of the Islamic world. In the chapter 2 Islam's Eastern Frontiers: Tamil, Chinese, and Malay Worlds, by Sunil S. Amrith, takes a comparative and connected view of Tamil- and Chinese-speaking Muslim communities in Southeast Asia. Tracing their journeys across the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea brings new dimensions to our understanding of Islam on the Indian Ocean Rim — bringing to light the cultural encounters that took place on its eastern frontiers. Over centuries, Tamil and Chinese Muslim traders laid down roots in the Malay societies through which they traveled, and in which many of them settled. Muslims constituted a vital part of the Tamil and Chinese Diasporas, which developed within firmer boundaries in the twentieth century along with new ideas of belonging and citizenship.

In Chapter 3, 'Spies in the Hejaz: Colonial Espionage in Jeddah by Eric Tagliacozzo, it is argued that the accumulation of coded caches of information, and the implementation of direct supervision over subject populations. One of the most important aspects of the colonial pilgrimage to Mecca was the attempt by European

colonial powers to control the passage of Muslim bodies to the holiest sites of global Islam. The connection between power and the sovereign was crucial to ruling in early modern times. However by the turn of the twentieth century, the ties between efforts at domination and various forms of "high modernist" government has changed man traditional maneuverings

Next chapter is named 'Little Men between Big Empires: Muslim Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Imperial Expansion' and authored by Seema Alavi. It is traced that in the late eighteenth century, Muslim reformists responded to the political crisis caused by the establishment of British rule in Northern India by writing religious texts that offered ways of coping with the changing times. These Mughal legatees, trained as Indo-Persian scholar, wrote in Persian, Arabic, and the North Indian vernacular, Urdu. The print culture of the early nineteenth century made their Urdu texts easily accessible to people. Their books drew the attention of readers to the Arab tradition as represented in particular in the Koran and the Hadith. They advised them to self-interpret religious scriptures to find their own solutions to the political crisis. Influenced by the new reformist learning that streamed in from the Arab world, they too hoped that this normative literature, with its stress on the individual, would unite Muslims globally

Next chapter is named as the, 'Revolutionaries, Maulvis, and Monks: Burma's Khilafat Moment, by Sana Aiyar. In this chapter author presented the case of Burmese Muslims in respect of Khilafat Movement during the second decade of twentieth century. Burma's Khilafat Moment Sana Aiyar Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal Emperor, died in Rangoon in 1862 where he had lived in exile for five years. He was buried near the Shwedagon Pagoda. With his burial in an unmarked grave. The colonial government planned to permanently eliminate the Mughals from Indian subcontinent. In this particular design it seems that British colonial authorities were successful in their in their objective. Zafar's grandson, Jamshed

Bakht, was dependent on his government "pension," while his great-grandson, Moazzam Sultan had joined a lawyer in the city as a clerk.

This paper named as, "The Bengali Muslim: language and space-making at the ocean's margins is authored by Iftekhar Iqbal. According to Iftekhar Iqbal, the evolution of Muslim public space tracked an analogous outline across pre-colonial South Asia. In whole of British India, at the heart of these developments were the Sufis. Those Sufis had sponsored different forms of "space-making" at the interface of their Trans regional itinerary and everyday life in their socio-political milieu. Those Sufis made themselves an indispensable part of the public space using a "pious network," in an urban enclave. This practice of space making assumed a new meaning in Bombay in the colonial economic condition since even deceased Sufis inspired such a process that their tombs continued to be the sites of religious and economic networks.

Next Chapter is 'The Meaning of Muslim Emancipation in Late-Colonial Agrarian Bengal, by Andrew Sartori. It is studied that "Muslim self-determination" and "Muslim emancipation" in late colonial Bengal had specific meanings in respect of their belongings. Muslim community in twentieth-century Bengal was conceived in terms of a normative aspiration to freedom rather than as an affirmation of traditional authority. In order to provide a plausible answer to this assertion, author termed the concept of "Muslim freedom" as varied and multifold with the range of ass possible meaning as it could be conceived by different people. This essay is especially important to the broad-based development of Muslim politics in agrarian Bengal up to late colonial settings

Last chapter named, "South Asian Islam and the Politics of German Orientalism' is penned by Kris Manjapra. Author presented unique study of the works by Muslim intellectuals of the British India in the twentieth century. For example, Muhammad Iqbal's dissertation of 1908, The Development of

Metaphysics in Persia, was written at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. In this early work, Iqbal seeks "to prepare a groundwork for a future history of Persian Metaphysics." He makes the cultural history of Persian thought stand out across a vast tableau of temporal change. In this study of origins and historical development, Iqbal locates the roots of Indo-Persian philosophy in the pre-Islamic philosophies of Zoroaster and Mazdak, and then traces their transformation through the influence of "Greek dualism" and "Islamic rationalism," which ultimately culminated in the Islamic tradition of Sufi thought. The dissertation was an assertion of Indo-Persian and Islamic identity born of what Iqbal asserts to be a great and ancient cosmopolitan legacy.

Book	Rethinking World History:
	Essays on Europe, Islam and World History (Studies
	in Comparative World History)
Author	Marshall Hodgson (Author), Edmund Burke III (Editor).
Language	English
ISBN	978-1-987900-16-3
Year of Publication	2018
Pages	328
Publisher	Cambridge University Press
Reviewed by	Adnan Tariq

In this volume, Edmund Burke III has collected articles and essays on world history and on the place of Islam in world history written by Marshall G. S. Hodgson. Marshall Goodwin Simms Hodgson (1922 –1968) was Islamic studies academic and a world historian at the University of Chicago. He was one of the most influential American historian of Islam due to his three-volume, "The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization". The work is recognized as a masterpiece that radically reconfigured the academic study of Islam. The Venture of Islam realize is not simply a history of Islam, but of the place of Islam in world history. In The Venture of Islam, Hodgson positioned Islam as a spiritual endeavor with a profound moral vision. In this voluminous book, he tried to i introduced new range of terminology of Islamic religion and history. In this way, he coined the terms of Islamicate. Hodgson also resituated the geographical locus of Islam by shifting attention away from an exclusive focus on Arab Islam to include the Persianate society. Marshall Hodgson criticized the Eurocentrism. According to his assertions, the West played a peripheral and backward role in the Afro-Eurasian cultural complex until the High Middle Ages.

The two most important influence on Hodgson's thought was the French

orientalist Louis Massignon from whom he learned respect for Islam. Marshall Hodgson coined and used the newly coined term, 'Islamicate" in the first volume of, 'The Venture of Islam. This term, "Islamicate' refers to the social complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims. Hodgson invented the term in response to the confusion surrounding such terms as "Islamic," "Islam," and "Muslim." Hodgson used the term to describe cultural manifestations of an Arabic and Persian literate tradition. These manifestations are not directly referable to the Islamic religion. On the contrary, they are more relevant to the "social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims. Hodgson is of the opinion that there is a range of of artistic, architectural, and literary styles found in the realm of Islamicate culture. According to his conception, those elements of Islamic society which are not shared by non-Muslims are not indicative of Islamicate culture. Hodgson used the term to demonstrate the importance of Islam as a cultural force that influenced non-Muslim forms of art, literature, and custom.

Hodgson's writings were a precursor to the modern world history approach.. He was critic of the prevailing Euro centrism and the concepts of orientalism. Hodgson painted a global picture of world history, in which the "Rise of Europe" was the product of millennia-long evolutionary developments in Eurasian society; modernity could conceivably have originated somewhere else. Indeed, he accepted that China in the twelfth century was close to an industrial revolution, a development that was derailed by the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth century. Occidental development had come ultimately from China, as did apparently, the idea of a civil service examination system, introduced in the eighteenth century. In such ways, the Occident seems to have been the unconscious heir of the abortive industrial revolution in China.

Hodgson denied original western exceptionalism and moved the divergence of Europe forward, from the Renaissance in the fourteenth century to the Scientific

Revolution of the seventeenth century. His explanations for the divergence are rooted in the idea of a 'great Western Transmutation.' This is not to be confused with the Industrial Revolution, as it includes variables more diverse than just industry. Hodgson posited that all the societal elements i.e. Industry, banking, health care, police, etc. of Western European nations became so advanced or technicalized and co-dependent that those societies were able to determine their own rate of progress.

Marshall Hodgson worked on Islamic history by setting Islam and Europe in the larger and broader context of world history. He introduced many concepts and scheme of periodizations. Among them, the most suggestive is the idea of the Renaissance as bringing the laggard 'agrarianate citied states' of Europe up to the level of other such civilizations. In this way by doing so, Hodgson's work undermined aspects of European 'exceptionalism'.

The editor's introduction and conclusion explain and criticize Hodgson's unusual historiographical position and analyses his interpretation of Islam. Hodgson's 'de-exceptionalising' of European history tends to situatehegemony, of the west. In this context, Hodgson urged that world history must be Asian history with Europe as a peripheral. One of his sections is entitled, 'Western Europe as Afro-Eurasian frontier'. His profession of Islamicist helped him to see the early experience of 'Islamdom' and Europe anew by comparing them. It is important to know that Marshall Hodgson's constant themes includes primarily dismantling the formation of Eurocentric perspectives and the need for a newly considered periodization of world history. According to Marshall Hodgson in this new scheme of world history, the centrality of Islam as the only one of the great traditional civilizations is the core theme. The vision make up the bulk of the first two sections of this book, "The interrelations of societies in history" "The role of Islam in world history"

Hodgson's interpretation of the "Great Transmutation" of European culture between 1600 and 1800 as a world historical event in not considered as a new phase in the development of Western civilization. On the contrary, many preconditions essential for the "Great Transmutation" originated from the Near East, China, or India. To Hodgson, it is not traditional Western culture that has come to dominate the rest of the globe but a transmuted West that threatens the survival of traditional or "agrarianate" Western culture as much as it does the "agrarianate" cultures of China, India, and the Near East. According to Hodgson, Sufis had turned largely to written tradition in vernacular Persian. Thus, they developed a style of writing rich in symbolism and mythic pre-Islamic aspects of Persian culture. In this perspective, Shi'ism became the state religion of Iran. Thus, Sufism and Shi'ism began to merged, with consequent Persian form of expression.

This volume also includes Hodgson's unfinished history of the world as, "The Unity of World History". Hodgson was critic of ethnocentrism in "World History and a World Outlook," originally published in 1944, he used that term to decry the tendency of Westerners to place the history of Western Europe and its Atlantic offspring at the center of world history-and his judicious reasoning speaks directly and sensibly to the current fracas over multiculturalism. In one of his important article, "Historical Method in Civilizational Studies," he anticipated some of the controversy about the Martin Bernal's Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. In this study he evolved a scheme that Greece remained culturally oriented to the East rather than the West. And also that "even vaunted Rome depended on Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean not only for her wheat, but for her teachers and model.

In the realm of Islamic scholarship, Hodgson is considered as an iconoclast. He challenged directly a number of the underlying assumptions of most scholars in the field. He was contemptuous of the erratic assumption that, from some point in

the early Middle Ages, the Islamic world found itself in irreversible decline. Islamic civilization, in his view, occupied a central and creative role on the stage of world history well into the seventeenth century, and did not find itself seriously challenged by the West until the momentous social, political, and above all cultural developments of the end of the eighteenth century, which he collectively labels the "Great Western Transmutation." Here again, Hodgson's insistence on the continuing creativity of early modem Islamic societies anticipates much scholarship of the last two decades. His argument is supported by both his vision of world history, in which no society within the Afro-Eurasian oikumene can be studied in isolation, and by his insightful concern about the Arabist bias of much Western scholarship on Islam. By the middle Ages, the Persian language and the cultural traditions transformed and geographically shifted the focus of Islamic civilization. Now afterwards, Islam, transformed into much larger. Hodgson's essay on "Modernity and the Islamic Heritage" is very important as it breaks many stereotypical themes. The editor of this volume sets Hodgson's vision within the framework constructed out of the tradition of academic Orientalism. The subject of Hodgson's study was civilization of Islam, or of other "high" cultural traditions. His emphasis upon the high cultural ideals of the Islamic "civilization" corresponds closely to the concerns of many Muslims themselves. Thus in this broader context it would be important to take his vision as a corrective to Western scholarship about Islam and Muslims civilizations as well.